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Scholars often focus on the beginning or ending stages of new venture development 
without attending to the middle stage of entrepreneurship, where innovations are developed, 
but lack market traction. While scholars recognize that innovations travel tenuous pathways 
that initiate at idea conception and culminate in commercialization, less research investigates 
the role entrepreneurs play in fostering the adoption of their own innovations within 
incumbent organizations. How do novel technologies and innovations gain organizational adoption and 
grow in market relevancy? To examine this overarching question, I conducted a 24-month field 
study of 54 entrepreneurial firms matriculating through a digital health accelerator, and the 
customer organizations (health systems, pharmaceutical companies and insurers), investors, 
government officials (local and state) engaging with the entrepreneurial firms to further their 
innovations. Each chapter of my dissertation draws upon this data to explore derivatives of 
this overarching question at different levels of analysis: (1) entrepreneurial firm; (2) the 
evolution of each firm’s underlying innovation; and (3) dyadic - between an entrepreneurial 
firm and an adopting organization.  
In the first paper of my dissertation, I focus on how entrepreneurial firms engage in 
market search: information gathering activities that probe whether an innovation can meet 
 
 vii 
market needs, to gain traction for their innovations. By tracing each firms’ search and 
learning practices, I identified three market search processes. Transactional searchers 
engaged in selective search, reluctantly revising their innovations in response to limited 
feedback. Confirmatory searchers engaged in broad search but selective learning, resisting 
adaptation of their innovations. Diagnostic searchers engaged in broad search and learned 
from ambiguous feedback to adapt their innovations, discovering new sources of value and 
revenue. By attending to all three search processes, I contribute a grounded theoretical 
explanation of how entrepreneurial firms vary in the ways they make progress toward market 
traction. In doing so, I reveal the hidden costs of market search and show how only some 
entrepreneurs surmount those costs. 
In the second paper, I examine how entrepreneurial firms repurpose their existing 
innovations to develop new use-cases and expand their market scope. Scholars frequently 
suggest that to grow, entrepreneurial firms must stay the course and scale existing 
capabilities, or pivot in entirely new directions. Yet these prescriptions neglect the 
recombinant process by which firms decompose and repurpose their existing innovations 
without straying from their strategic course. With detailed analysis of 58 use-cases from 54 
entrepreneurial firms innovating in digital health, I show how entrepreneurial firms varied in 
their pursuit of organizational adoption. I show that when entrepreneurs pursued a customer 
centric process, they developed disruptive ways to repurpose their innovations, but 
strategically paced the introduction of these extensions to seed adoption. Firms that 
leveraged a market centric process, also developed novel ways to repurpose their 
innovations, but immediately deployed all aspects of their innovations in attempt to beat the 
competition. Only a customer centric process aided entrepreneurs in gaining organizational 
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adoption for their innovations. By unpacking the recombinant process by which 
entrepreneurial firms create new uses for existing innovations, I contribute a critical 
mechanism that helps explain how entrepreneurial firms gain adoption for their innovations 
as they grow.  
The third paper explores how novel innovations are adopted when they threaten to 
displace adopting organizations’ work practices. With a novel data set of 13 dyadic pairs 
formed between six entrepreneurial firms and three prospective customer organizations, I 
analyze how entrepreneurs revised and repositioned their innovations to address each 
organization’s concerns. All six entrepreneurial firms had developed innovations that utilized 
machine learning to perform medical diagnostics work. By exploring the process of adoption 
between pairs of entrepreneurs and adopters, I induct the contingencies that trigger different 
strategies within the same firm. I show how outside innovators can play different roles in 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................................iv  
ABSTRACT ..........................................................................................................................................vi  
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................................ix   
LIST OF EXHIBITS & TABLES .....................................................................................................x 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................xi  
INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................1  
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION …………………………………………………….5 
RESEARCH SETTING ......................................................................................................................9 
METHODS .........................................................................................................................................18 
SEARCH FOR A MARKET: HOW ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS GAIN MARKET 
TRACTION ……………………………………………………………………………..32  
GAINING ORGANIZATIONAL ADOPTION: FINDING NEW USES FOR 
EXISTING INNOVATIONS …………………………………………………………..50 
DIGITAL DIAGNOSIS, WORK PRACTICE DISPLACEMENT AND 
IMPLEMENTING NOVEL INNOVATIONS ………………………………………...77 
CONTRIBUTIONS ……………………………………………………………………...99 
REFERENCES ….………………………………………………………………………135 





LIST OF EXHIBITS & TABLES 
 
Exhibit 1. Cure’s office space …………………………………………………………….108 
Table 1. Entrepreneurial firm descriptive data at time of Cure program entry ……………109 
Table 2. Overview of types and timing of data collected …………………………………111 
Table 3. Cure Cohort 1 Entrepreneurial Firm descriptive data a Cure program entry …….112 
Table 4. Variation in Entrepreneurial firm Market search ………………………………...114 
Table 5. Market Traction Progress ……………………………………………………….116 
Table 6. Table 6: Search & Learning Practices Enacted by Entrepreneurial Firms in Cure 
Cohort 1 ………………………………………………………………………...117 
 
Table 7. Entrepreneurial Firm Data for Cohort 1 by Market Search Type ………………..119 
 
Table 8. Customer centric process activities and representative data ……………………..120 
 
Table 9. Market centric process activities and representative data ………………………..121 
 
Table 10. Use case adoption rates by process …………………………………………….122 
 
Table 11. Customer & Entrepreneurial Firm Dyads ……………………………………...123 
 
Table 12. Types of Customer Issues Encountered by Entrepreneurial firms ……………..124 
 
Table 13. Type of Changes to Entrepreneurial Firms’ Innovations ………………………126 
 
Table 14a. Decisioning stage issues and adaptations ……………………………………...127 
 
Table 14b. Integrating stage issues and adaptations ………………………………………128 
 









Figure 1. Extant research across major stages of the venture development lifecycle ……...130 
 
Figure 2. Overview of Dissertation Papers ……………………………………………….131 
 
Figure 3. Overview of Cure Accelerator Program Annual Program Timeline …………….132 
 
Figure 4. Variation in Entrepreneurial Firm Market Search ………………………………133 
 






INTRODUCTION: Observations from the Field  
Excerpts from Memo: January 6, 2017 
The Cure venture accelerator occupies a big space. Space for 16 staff members, 100 
plus entrepreneurs (representing approximately 30 startups), and a multitude of visitors such 
as investors, advisors, and experts that might meet with entrepreneurs over the course of 
Cure’s six-month accelerator program. As exhibit 1 relays, the space is open and highly 
modular. The staff frequently reconfigures, low and high-top tables, couches, and chairs to 
accommodate intimate team meetings, or large scale, 500-person healthcare conferences. 
Over the last few weeks, as the Cure staff selected 30 startups to join their program, 
they hosted: informational sessions about their accelerator program; meetings with sponsors 
and vendors; meetings with potential program judges; and a pitch competition. The space 
teemed with life. Not a single desk space remained unoccupied. Now, three weeks after 
selecting firms to join the program and move into Cure’s office, the space is empty. The 
offices entrepreneurs had argued with the staff about requiring are empty. The comfy 
couches are empty. No doodles or paper lie around; no white board sheds remanence of 
previously penned diagrams.  
About a week into the program, I asked Diane, one of the accelerator staff members, 
what was going? She told me, “it” was fine. Naturally, it would take the entrepreneurs a bit 
to move in. But the days progress and the space remains sparsely filled. The staff is now 
concerned, evidenced by their increasingly outlandish rationale for why the entrepreneurs do 
not show up: “It’s the holidays; Parking is expensive; We don’t have a coffee machine; 
Entrepreneurs work weird hours and we probably just don’t see them”. One staff member 





did. The staff plan to focus their weekly status meeting on the matter.  
-End of memo- 
 
Excerpts from Memo: January 9, 2017 (includes quotes from transcribed status meeting) 
On my way to Cure’s weekly status meeting, I ran into three members of [name of 
startup] in the elevator. Within the confines of the elevator, they were talking quite 
animatedly about a difficult customer. The customer asked to extend their free product trial. 
From what I could gather, two people wanted to grant the extension, in fear of otherwise 
losing the customer. I hoped they would continue their discussion and walk, where I was 
headed, into the Cure office space. Their startup was recently selected to join Cure’s six-
month venture accelerator program and as part of the program, granted free office space. 
But curiously they did not, nor did they show up at any point later in the day. Even tonight, 
as I reflect on today’s events, I wonder how the members of [startup] resolved their 
discussion? I also wonder where they went?  
The staff always meets Monday morning to talk about what happened the week prior 
and plan for the week to come. This meeting was a bit different as they focused the whole 
hour on “the missing entrepreneurs” as they put it. They bandied about ideas to convince 
the entrepreneurs to come into the Cure office space, such as getting an espresso machine 
and discounting parking. But in the course of the meeting, the staffed realized the 
entrepreneurs were not going to use the space, as envisioned.  
Diane (staff member): How do we know [the entrepreneurs] are actually 
doing anything? 
 
Nigel (program director – prior startup founder): Come on – that is silly? 





Susan (staff member): But how do we help them, if they don’t show up?  
 
Nigel: I guess that is the root of our problem, we want to help. But maybe 
these entrepreneurs need a different type of help. When I participated [name 
of an accelerator program] I was at a much earlier stage in my startup’s 
development. I got so much from interacting with the other members of my 
cohort – the other entrepreneurs. They helped me figure out how to refine my 
idea, how to get a first investor, how do basically run a startup. But I didn’t 
really know anything. And perhaps more importantly, I had time to think 
about this stuff. But these startups, are at a different stage. They have 
products. They have money. They are launched. And they have a different set 
of problems. See, they need to convince people to actually buy their product. 
Convincing the first customer to buy, that’s actually sort of easy. Really 
innovative firms like taking chances and as an entrepreneur you are willing to 
give things away to learn from those experiences. Convincing the fourth or 
fifth customer, who is not in it for the novelty, that is something else. 
Especially since now, you need to be paid. And that, really taking a product to 
market, is the thing entrepreneurs really struggle with. You can’t do that inside 
some space. You have to do that out there. Meeting with customers, working 
with customers. Prospecting, hitting the pavement. You have to be out there.  
 
The entrepreneurs were not using the office space because they faced a different set of 
challenges than those faced by early-stage entrepreneurs. As Nigel relayed, early-stage 
entrepreneurs confront the challenge of developing a viable product which involves 
conceptualizing an offering, producing and testing a product, eliciting resources from a first 
set of investors and creating some sort of loose organizational structure to support 
development. But the entrepreneurs at Cure faced different challenges, those associated with 
gaining traction in the market. These challenges could not be solved strictly with a white 
board sitting in an office.  
-End of memo- 
The challenges faced by entrepreneurs at Cure – how to gain traction for their novel 
innovations, seemed critical but yet, underappreciated by both scholars and practitioners. 





culminates when an innovation penetrates the broader social system, or ecosystem in which 
it is situated (Rogers, 1983) As Nigel shared with me in an interview after the status meeting, 
“I don’t have a clue what to do. I mean, I have my experience to draw from, but they don’t 
really write books about this stuff, this execution stuff. How do you go from a few 
customers to a shit ton?” This sentiment was not just articulated by Nigel, but by many of 
the entrepreneurs I engaged with over my time embedded within the Cure accelerator. For 
example, the founder at RECOVERY, an addiction recovery application, referred to gaining 
traction, as that of going from a beggar to a chooser, which is not a simple transition.  As the 
founder shared: 
In the beginning you take all the business you can get. You beta everything. 
Which basically means you give away stuff for free, customize stuff for 
customers, whatever it takes. But over time, you can only take paying 
customers, you have to be more choosy. You can’t just do what the customer 
wants. My co-founder and I are constantly having this debate. Are we still 
beggars, or can we be choosers? We want to be choosers. When can we be 
choosers? 
 
This was made clear again by the founders I recognized in the elevator. I caught up with 
them many days later and asked why they had not come to the office. Jim, the CEO, shared 
that they were actually in the building meeting with a customer. Jim told me that they were 
so busy, meeting with customers, suppliers, and prospects that the elevator conversation was 
the first time all three founders had been together, in person “without others”, in weeks.  
Originally, the motivation for this dissertation was to understand how entrepreneurs, 
situated within a common space competed and collaborated to advance their ventures. Yet, 
from these observations, I uncovered a larger, more general problem encountered by all of 
the entrepreneurs I engaged with at Cure: How do entrepreneurs gain market traction and 





entrepreneurs transition from beggars to choosers?  
INTRODUCTION: Theoretical Motivation 
Not only did the staff at Cure struggle to help entrepreneurs at this stage of venture 
development: where their innovations were conceptually viable but economically unsettled, 
scholarly literature does little to direct entrepreneurs on how to proceed. Entrepreneurship is 
often defined as the process of converting novel innovations into viable ventures capable of 
economic impact or social use (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003; Rao, 2008; Garud & Karnøe 2003). 
Yet, as Figure 1 relays, research primarily focuses on the beginning or end of this process to 
the neglect of examining how entrepreneurial firms progress through the middle stages of 
venture development. In the early stages, cognition, identity, prior experience, social capital 
and preferences for taking risk can all help explain whether an entrepreneurial firm identifies 
an opportunity (Burton, Sorensen & Beckman 2002; Sorensen & Sorenson, 2003; Grimes, 
2018; Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979; Sorenson & Stuart, 2008) or acquires resources (Hallen, 
2008; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012). Scholars often attempt to predict late-stage outcomes 
based on early-stage characteristics, without attending to the processes in between (e.g., 
Chen, Croson, Elfenbein & Posen, 2018). In later stages, if and how entrepreneurial firms 
adapt in response to environment shifts can predict venture outcomes (Van de Ven & Poole, 
1995; Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Bingham & 
Davis, 2012; Marx & Hsu, 2015). For example, Marx & Hsu (2015) argued that the late-stage 
adjustments made by bio-tech firm Swanson rather than their initial strategy was critical to 
their ultimate performance.   





occurs during a point at which entrepreneurs are highly vulnerable to failure. While 
approximately 20 percent of ventures fail in early stages of development, during the first two 
years, 45 percent fail by year five.1 At this juncture, entrepreneurs are no longer at an early 
stage where their options for strategic action are boundless (Gans, Stern & Wu, 2019), and 
they have yet to accumulate the resources needed to manage multiple initiatives or weather a 
series of setbacks (Zhao et al., 2017). As such, entrepreneurs struggle attending to all facets 
of venture development, which involve raising funding, developing scalable organizational 
processes and procedures, establishing administrative systems, managing ongoing customer 
relations, procuring and sustaining talented staff, all while gaining traction for novel 
innovations. Further, not only is it difficult to allocate sparce resources across such a 
multiplicity of priorities, but the actions entrepreneurs employ to develop their firms, may 
conflict with those needed to gain traction for their innovations in the market.  
For example, as entrepreneurs develop their ventures, scholars suggest they 
progressively focus on building scale (Kazanjian, 1988; Chandler, 1990; Desantola & Gulati, 
2017; Tidar & Eisenhardt, 2020). Scaling involves putting processes, organizational 
structures, and human resources in place to generate replicable outputs; reduce production 
costs, and increase sales without incurring significant additional costs (Chandler, 1990). For 
example, as Eisenmann and Wagonfeld (2012) explain, in the early stages of Responsys, a 
cloud computing company, the firm always agreed to make ad hoc customizations, even if 
costly to accommodate. But as the firm grew, these decisions were made through formalized 
channels, where managers vetted costs and benefits before committing to a change. Thus, to 
 





generate scale, firms increasingly focus on establishing a standardized set of product 
offerings. Without some semblance of standardized offerings, it is difficult for firms to 
develop the routinized internal processes, activity systems and structures that are often 
affiliated with scaling (Chandler, 1990; Wheelwright and Hayes, 1985; Desantola & Gulati, 
2017). 
Yet, gaining market traction often requires continuous negotiation, piloting, and 
constant iteration in response to feedback to secure broad stakeholder support. This is not a 
cost free, or scalable exchange for entrepreneurial firms. To gain traction, and “penetrate a 
social system” in the words of Rogers (1983), entrepreneurs often form partnerships with 
lead-users (Von Hippel, 1986; 2005; Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 2006; Dahlander & 
Frederiksen, 2012); other firms in the value chain (Adner, 2012; Adner & Kapoor, 2010); 
engage with activists (Rao, 2008); or form research and development alliances (Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005). Although these partnerships help entrepreneurs identify needs and 
preferences of varying stakeholder groups (Ozcan & Gurses, 2016), and build market 
momentum (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2008), these diverse stakeholders can introduce 
conflicting or ambiguous feedback (e.g., Gaba & Joseph, 2015) that does not lend itself to 
cogent, coherent prescriptions as to how to adapt an innovation in ways that foster 
adoption. Exchanges with external stakeholders can propel an entrepreneurial venture 
forward, but also consume precious resources, time and attention from young organizations 
that can ill afford it (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965; Stern, Gans & Wu, 2017). While external 
stakeholders may initiate interest in an entrepreneur’s innovation, their interests can waver, 
triggering costly modifications, or worse appropriation of an entrepreneur’s innovation 





stakeholders can take time and effort on the part of entrepreneurs trying to assess who will 
commit to their innovation and who will waste their time. Taken together, these factors can 
challenge an entrepreneur’s ability to scale and convert their innovation from conceptually 
feasible to commercially viable. Yet little research addresses how entrepreneurs adjudicate 
these conflicting priorities to gain traction for their innovations while also growing in a 
scalable way. How do entrepreneurs gain market traction and grow the relevancy of their novel innovations? 
To examine this overarching question, I conducted a 24-month field study of 54 
entrepreneurial firms matriculating through a common digital health accelerator, Cure, and 
the customer organizations (health systems, pharmaceutical companies and insurers), 
investors, government officials (local and state) engaging with the entrepreneurial firms to 
further their innovations. Each paper within my dissertation draws upon this data to explore 
derivatives of this overarching question at different levels of analysis: (1) entrepreneurial 
firm; (2) the evolution of each firm’s underlying innovation; and (3) dyadically - between an 
entrepreneurial firm and an adopting organization. Each discrete paper also sequentially 
analyzes different points in an entrepreneurs’ process of gaining market traction for a novel 
innovation. As figure 2 relays, the first paper explains how firms’ conduct market search to 
identify product and market fit. The second paper examines the next step, fostering 
organizational adoption. Lastly, the third paper examines how entrepreneurs pilot their 
innovations with adopting organizations. As figure 2 implies, these steps are sequential, but 
far from linear as entrepreneurial firms often circle back in the process, moving for example, 
from piloting back to market search. As such, the papers that comprise this dissertation 
attempt to focus on each step of the process, but are not so strictly bounded, as boundaries 






The papers presented as part of this dissertation draw from a common research 
setting. All of the firms I studied participated in the accelerator program, Cure and were 
attempting to gain traction for novel innovations in the field of digital health. Digital health 
is defined as the convergence of healthcare and digitally-enabled technologies which may 
support medical administration, care management, diagnostics, digital medicine, patient 
education, prevention and wellness (Mintzberg, 2018; Topol, 2019). The field of digital 
health is a critical area for study as scholars and policy makers alike posit that adoption of 
digital innovations can significantly improve healthcare outcomes or reduce spending which 
is predicted to represent 19.4 percent of the United States GDP by 20272 (Cutler, 2011; 
Mintzberg, 2018; Topol, 2019). Venture capital investment in digital health has also recently 
intensified. In 2020, entrepreneurial firms raised $14.1 billion in venture funding, an 
approximate 2X increase over funding raised in 2018.3 The critical need for digital health 
innovation became only more salient over the last year as our society struggled delivering 
care to vulnerable patients unable to receive tests or procedures through traditional, in-
patient settings, during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Understanding entrepreneurship in digital health because of the promise it offers to 
society is a strong motivation for this dissertation, yet it is not the sole reason I focused on 
this topic. While entrepreneurs can access a wealth of resources to develop digital health 









services (Zeistma, et al. 2019) or the energy industry (Kirtley & O’Mahony, 2019), innovating 
in digital health often requires managing institutional complexity brought about by 
regulators; mediated sales pathways; insufficient technical standards, conflicting performance 
metrics; and long, unpredictable sales cycles (Cutler, 2011). These conditions muddy how an 
entrepreneur might otherwise go to market and build a stable customer base for their 
innovations.  
Research exploring the process of entrepreneurship has long favored consumer 
markets settings (Van de Ven & Polley, 1992; Garud & Kanoe, 2000; Haragdon & Douglas, 
2001; Ozcan & Gurses, 2015; Eisenhardt & McDonald, 2020; McDonald & Gao; Eisenhardt 
& Tidar, 2020) where issues regarding mediated sales pathways, conflicting performance 
metrics and long sales cycles are less of a challenge. As such, our understand of how 
entrepreneurs develop their ventures, at any point of the venture lifecycle, remains limited 
— as the experiences of entrepreneurs attempting to penetrate consumer markets might 
differ dramatically from those in business-to-business markets. This potential difference is a 
critical feature of my setting, as firms in digital health primarily engage in business-to-
business sales. Unlike entrepreneurs innovating in customer settings, entrepreneurs in the 
field of digital health face three distinct challenges to gaining market traction: (1) identifying 
paying customers; (2) aligning divergent customer requirements; and (3) customizing their 
innovations to customers’ unique environments. While some of these challenges may be 
unique to entrepreneurs trying to penetrate markets in the field of digital health, they also 
may generalize more broadly to the entrepreneurs operating in business-to-business markets.  
Identify paying customers. Sales in digital health are mediated, as patients and doctors are 





For example, most entrepreneurial firms in the field rely on patients and caregivers to 
advocate for their innovations. However, these audiences generally do have the means, or 
inclination, to pay for entrepreneurs’ offerings out of pocket. Thus, many of the 
entrepreneurs I observed attempted to gain product coverage with insurance companies. 
Once covered, firms banked on their offerings becoming more desirable to patients and 
caregivers, who would no longer shoulder the burden of payment.  
However, to secure coverage by insurers, entrepreneurs often must demonstrate the 
effectiveness of their innovations through pilots and clinical tests with legitimate third 
parties, such as a hospitals or clinics. For example, NUDGE, a firm at Cure, had to prove 
their product diminished addiction relapse in a clinical setting before an insurer would 
commit to offer coverage. To convince insurers of their efficacy, NUDGE needed a hospital 
to partner on a clinical pilot: “We realize that we have to get this reimbursed. But to do so, 
we have to first pilot with clinics. It’s like we have to sell the product to them, even though 
they aren’t buying it.” While ultimately NUDGE had to convince patients to use and doctors 
to recommend their software, this pathway was mediated by insurers who could cover the 
cost of the software.  
Complicating matters, while insurers are a customer segment of interest for most 
entrepreneurial firms in digital health (Porter, 2019), hospitals, clinics, state agencies and 
pharmaceutical companies are also potential paying customers. For example, hospitals are 
often willing buyers of technology which promises to coordinate care across multiple 
specialties to satisfy requirements of the Affordable Care Act. With few resources to expend, 
entrepreneurs struggle to prioritize across multiple customer segments. For example, another 





customer base from one million in annual reoccurring revenue to two million: “Which one 
do we prioritize? Payers? Providers? Each requires some adaptation of our innovation and 
new research to understand their unique needs and preferences.”  
Further, even within a single organization, locating a person that shares strategic 
interest and the budget to pay for an entrepreneur’s innovation is far from easy. For 
example, to gain commitment for adoption with an Insurer, FALL, a firm at Cure focused 
on workplace safety, first had to convince the head of innovation that their venture was 
worth supporting. While, the head of innovation was incentivized to encouraged adoption of 
FALL’s novel technology, they had little purchasing authority. Business unit heads 
determined whether there was adequate budget to purchase FALL’s product and did not 
share the same incentives:  
So, the innovation group was trying to push us through but then there were 
other parts of INSURE that were like what’s in it for me? Why would I stick 
out my neck for this new innovative solution when I already have 
something that works well?  Maybe not as best as it could but it doesn’t 
need to work as best as it could because I’m still making my paycheck and 
like I’m not going to get a raise because I’m being innovative. And it is 
those other parts of INSURE that make the decision. 
 
FALL met with over six different business unit heads to find one with both a budget and 
strategic interest in their software. Determining how to prioritize and navigate engagement 
even within a single mature customer takes time and effort on the part of entrepreneurs who 
often do not have ex ante knowledge of how a given customer operates. 
Aligning divergent customer needs. Because the field of health is unsettled (Zeistma, 2019), 
customers often have conflicting needs, competing metrics, standards and priorities which 
are challenging to resolve within a unified set of system of requirements. To exacerbate 





purposefully reduce data sharing among “competitors” to maintain revenue streams in the 
form of care and coverage for high value patient segments (Adler-Milstein & Pfeifer, 2017). 
This may be especially true as health systems convert to risk sharing or value-based payment 
systems (Topol, 2019). The implication for entrepreneurs is that they frequently confront 
non-standard institutional guidelines on issues such as data privacy, security and 
performance measurement. For example, required status as a cover entity for HIPAA 
remains unclear and up to the discretion of customer organizations. Many entrepreneurial 
firms, from my observation, are willing to make investments in data security, to ensure their 
practices comply with accepted standards, but on what foundational requirements should 
they base these investments? Moreover, quite recently new organizations have formed which 
claim to certify entrepreneurial firms’ data security practices in the field of digital health. 
These certifications are expensive (easily $1 million) for firms short on resources, and it is 
unclear how seriously customer organizations weigh these outsider certifications.  
Customizing to customers’ unique environments. Due to a lack of institutional standards, 
implementation of new digital health technologies often require customization to integrate 
with customers’ working environments. Customers often insist on costly adjustments and 
modifications to an entrepreneur’s innovation to fit with their unique specifications, needs 
and views. During my time in the field, I observed entrepreneurs caught in the “trap” of 
continuous, constant, iteration to modify their innovations based on customer’s unique 
requests to align innovations to their operating environment. As shared by one firm at Cure, 
ALIGNPLAT, “I know that I shouldn’t be doing this. But, yep, I am doing it. And it is 
annoying. They [hospital system] pretend like we don’t have to do it, but come on. We do. I 





improved the viability of an entrepreneur’s venture, few entrepreneurs, in my study, have the 
resources available to customize their product for every customers’ unique environment.  As 
noted by ALIGNPLAT, “Honestly, [the fix] maybe irrelevant to everyone else. But I have to 
do it, if I want the deal with this customer.” ALIGNPLAT was stuck in a trap of making 
costly customizations if they wanted to acquire new customers. Entrepreneurs eager to “ink 
a deal” with customers receive an abundance of customer feedback, but attending to all of 
this feedback can be as harmful as it is helpful. Thus, entrepreneurs strive to filter pertinent 
input from noise, while trying to convince customers of what is critical.  
Taken together, these product to market challenges spawned long, unpredictable 
sales cycles which threatened entrepreneurs’ ability to gain market traction. Across all 54 
firms in my sample, the average time to close a deal with a customer (conditioned on a deal 
closing) took on average 7 months from first contact: “An untenable amount of time when 
you have to make payroll, and you only have three or four other customers” according to 
CONTENTVR. When deals did not close, it could take 7 months to realize that a contract 
would not materialize.  
VENTURE ACCELERATOR PROGRAMS AND THE CURE PROGRAM 
Venture accelerators are defined as, “Fixed-term, cohort-based programs for 
startups, including mentorship and/or educational components, that culminate in a 
graduation event.” (Cohen et al., 2019, p. 1782). The purpose of these organizations is to 
“accelerate” positive entrepreneurial outcomes. Almost all accelerator programs are 
competitive, as firms must qualify to gain entry. Most accelerator organizations take minimal 
sums of equity from participating startups in exchange for mentoring, physical space, and 





(2019), accelerators have proliferated in the United States from the first, founded in 2005 to 
almost 2,000 by 2016. Not surprisingly, scholarly interest in accelerator programs has also 
grown, as recent research has probed a wide range of related topics such as how accelerator 
programs are designed, (Cohen et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Gonzalez-Uribe & 
Leatherbee, 2016), how accelerators evaluate startups (Fehder, 2017) accelerator outcomes 
(Cohen et al., 2018); and accelerator effects on startup development and outcomes (Grimes, 
2018; Yu, 2019).   
Yet, this dissertation does not foreground accelerators, but rather the firms 
matriculating through accelerator programs. Accelerators offer an excellent field laboratory 
to study the emergence and creation of new ventures, some of which, will mature into 
thriving organizations. Through accelerator programs, scholars gain access to a pool of 
organizations in their nascent stage, not typically available for study through commonly 
available databases. This allows scholars to observe and examine a set of potential 
organizations at risk for failure, which can broaden our understanding of the factors that 
encourage and threaten organizational development. With a steady turnover of 
entrepreneurs, cohort to cohort, accelerators provide scholars with the ability to both 
develop and test theory (Edmondson & McManus, 2007)), study theories of process and 
variance (Dougherty, 1990; Eisenhardt, 2020) and develop successive research programs, 
which can examine different types of research questions over time. For example, because the 
firms that matriculate through accelerator programs are often evaluated based on a common 
set of criteria, such as strength of advisory board, founder experience, funds raised, quality 
of idea, quality of team, etc., researchers can draw a comparable longitudinal sample of firms. 





demography or geography of founders to answering questions about firm processes, 
practices, growth, strategic decision making and execution which often require examination 
over time. 
The Cure accelerator program was founded in 2016 to convene external industry 
experts, investors, partners, and customers to help entrepreneurial firms introduce digital 
technologies into established healthcare organizations. Many accelerators accept the best 
entrepreneurial firms, regardless of sector (Cohen, 2013). Sector diversity offers intriguing 
opportunities to examine research questions at the industry level of analysis. However, it 
complicates field and qualitative research designs structured for analysis of firms, individuals 
or innovations as it is difficult to control for variance associated with sector or industry 
factors (e.g., Porter, 1980). Cure offers a unique opportunity to control for such variance as 
only digital health firms were accepted to the program. Unlike most accelerator programs 
that source early-stage entrepreneurs looking to develop their ideas into viable products 
(Cohen, 2013), Cure’s acceptance criteria required applicants to have a viable innovation and 
some business traction defined as reoccurring revenue or funding. Since this dissertation 
focused on how entrepreneurial firms expanded relevancy, rather than how they launched 
their innovations, the firms matriculating through Cure were at an ideal point in their 
maturity for study. Further, following Cohen (2013), Cure is an unstructured accelerator as it 
offered participants classes, physical space, and access to mentors. However, entrepreneurs 
were not required to, and often did not, use these resources. This is an important feature as 
otherwise the accelerator’s programming or influence might explain why entrepreneurial 
firms pursued gains in market traction through a particular pathway.  





Cure as part of the 2017 or 2018 cohorts. Following Dougherty & Hardy (1996), developing 
a sample of this size enabled me to investigate both commonalities and variance in the ways 
entrepreneurial firms attempted to gain market traction. None of the entrepreneurial firms 
selected to join the Cure program in either cohort declined. All of the entrepreneurial firms 
that applied to the 2017 and 2018 cohort were first evaluated by a group of randomly 
assigned judges with expertise in healthcare. In both years, 60 firms were selected to live 
pitch to a set of randomly assigned judges for final admittance into the program. In total, 28 
entrepreneurial firms in year one and 26 entrepreneurial firms in year two progressed 
through the Cure program. Figure 3 provides an overview of the program timing. The two 
cohorts were selected into Cure based on a set of common criteria such as team strength, 
existing traction in the market, the importance of the market problem their innovation 
attempted to solve, strength of their technological solution and plans for market expansion. 
Cure’s acceptance criteria from cohort one to cohort two did not change despite growth in 
applications: 230 entrepreneurial firms applied for admission to cohort one and 434 
entrepreneurial firms applied for cohort two. Table 1 provides descriptive data on the 54 
entrepreneurial firms I studied as part of this dissertation. As Table 1 suggests, at program 
entry, the selected cohorts, on average, were fairly similar based on revenue generated, 
founder demographics, funds raised, firm age, and markets addressed. However, at program 
entry, entrepreneurial firms in cohort two had been in existence slightly longer (three years) 
compared with entrepreneurial firms in cohort one (2.8 years) and had on average raised 







This dissertation leverages a field research design to understand how entrepreneurial 
firms gained traction for their novel innovations. I used this approach because theory 
regarding how entrepreneurs grow the relevancy of their innovations was underdeveloped 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007) and theory development benefits when researchers enroll 
themselves within their context of study (Garud & Rappa, 1994; Langley, 1999; Langley et 
al., 2013). I conducted over 1,000 hours of ethnographic observations, 200 interviews, and 
collected data such as entrepreneurial firm technological specs and business requirements, 
strategic planning documents, program and task management reports, news articles and 
blogs. Table 2 provides an overview of the data collected over the course of this dissertation. 
My engagement in the field alternated between participant observer to active 
participant (Alder & Alder, 1990). For example, with some audiences and during certain 
periods of my time in the field, such as when entrepreneurial firms met with customers to 
discuss a prospective contract, I purely observed the interactions of my subjects. At other 
times, I agreed to engage more directly in the field by volunteering to help at accelerator 
events, and by providing feedback to both the accelerator staff and entrepreneurs (unrelated 
to the topics of my research). Moving back and forth between these ethnographic positions 
enabled me to allocate my attention across a robust set of subjects while still generating the 
trust need to discuss less comfortable topics (such as the topic of work displacement which 
features in the third paper of dissertation) with key informants by engaging more deeply in 
the field.  To enrich our understanding of how novel innovations gain market traction, I 
sought to incorporate the diverse perspectives of those I encountered in the field: from 





design focused on a distinct level of analysis.  
 In the first paper of the dissertation, I examined how 28 entrepreneurial firms, 
comprising the first Cure cohort, made progress gaining market traction for their 
innovations through a process of market search. This kind of “how”, process-based research 
question was best suited for field research where contemporaneous observation of 
entrepreneurial firms and their interactions with external stakeholders could be observed in 
situ over time (Becker, 1963; Langley, 1999; Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, Van de Ven, 
2013). My analysis centered around identifying the questions entrepreneurs asked to prompt 
feedback from diverse stakeholder groups, who entrepreneurs engaged with, the type of 
feedback entrepreneurs received and the practices they deployed in response to this 
feedback. I also unpacked the different types of progress (cultivating a vetted customer 
pipeline, revising a target market, gaining new sources of revenue) firms made in gaining 
market traction.  
Of particular importance to the research design featured in the second paper of my 
dissertation, was the data I captured on how each entrepreneurial firm adapted their 
underlying innovation and their evolving understanding of the “use-cases” relevant for their 
innovation. Originally conceived by object-oriented software developers, use-cases bound 
the interactions between a technological object and a set of specific users. As expressed by 
Jacobson, (1993) use-cases “look at the system from the user’s perspective. Each way a user 
will use the system is a view, which is often identified as a “use-case”. A use-case is a simple 
way to use a system (p. 27).” In my setting, each use-case an entrepreneurial firm developed 
conveyed a plausible way a customer segment might use an entrepreneurial firm’s digital 





entrepreneur’s innovation for a new group of customers, and thus increase their market 
scope. I analyzed the varied processes and practices entrepreneurial firms utilized to 
discover, develop and position these new use-cases in an attempt to grow their market 
scope.  
In the third paper, I employed qualitative methods to analyze the dyadic interactions 
of six entrepreneurial firms utilizing machine learning to automate medical diagnostics work 
with a common set of three customer organizations. Analysis at the dyadic level was useful 
to understand how entrepreneurs and customers created and maintained the relationships 
needed to adopt a novel innovation, without giving primacy to either party (Graebner, 2007; 
Larson, 2000). Through this analysis, I unpacked differences in adopting organizations’ 
concerns regarding machine learning and traced how variance in concerns triggered changes 
in the way entrepreneurial firms developed and repositioned their innovations for customer 
consumption.  
Data Collection  
Across all three papers, I collected three types of field data: ethnographic 
observations, interviews and entrepreneurial firm level data consisting of strategic planning 
documents, evaluations for acceptance to Cure, applications to Cure, blog posts, product 
requirements and product design documentation. Leveraging a wide variety of data sources 
was critical to tracing how firms adapted their innovations over time as: “uncovering the 
different facets of technology requires a comprehensive data collection effort using multiple 





Ethnographic Observation. I observed entrepreneurs’ interactions with customers, 
subject matter experts and users as they identified, tested and attempted to sell new use-cases 
over a two-year period. This data revealed that entrepreneurs believed that their new use-
cases could help them grow and prompted me to more deeply explore the relationship 
between growth and organizational adoption. During these observations, customers, 
influencers and decision makers expressed their hesitations, enthusiasm and, at times, 
outrage for an entrepreneurial firms’ new use-case.  
Interviews. I conducted interviews with the CEO or founders of all 54 firms for a total of 
150 entrepreneurial firm interviews. I also conducted 15 interviews with decision makers or 
influencers at potential customer organizations. The interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 
two hours. In most cases, I interviewed multiple members of each firm and conducted 
multiple interviews per firm. The majority of my interviews occurred immediately after 
members of the cohort gained admittance to the program and again, right before they 
completed the program. However, I also conducted interviews throughout the course of 
study.  
Entrepreneurial Firm Data. The entrepreneurial firm data I collected comprised of three 
critical elements: firm applications at program entry and exit; monthly firm updates which 
detailed product requirements and how entrepreneurial firms were adapting their 
technologies and product strategies; and periodic alumni surveys which queried whether 
firms gained revenue, signed new contracts, acquired funding and hired new employees post 
completion of the program. Entrepreneurial firms did not just fill out applications at 





progressed during their time at Cure. I also collected strategic planning documents, blog 
posts, and press releases that entrepreneurial firms published detailing how patients, doctors, 
administrators, etc. used their innovations. From these data, I construct an understanding of 
how entrepreneurial firms attempted to identify and develop use-cases over time.  
PAPER 1 – LEARNING FROM MARKET SEARCH 
Scholars have examined how entrepreneurial firms acquire resources from investors 
(Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012; Hallen, 2008; Lerner, 2009; Zott and Huy, 2007) or family and 
friends (Dahl and Sorenson, 2010). Yet, how entrepreneurial firms engage in market search 
with partners, suppliers and customers to learn where their innovations can gain a foothold 
in the market is less appreciated. In mature or established firms, the tasks associated with 
gaining market traction can be allocated to discrete divisions within an organization (Benner 
& Tushman, 2003; Gupta, Smith, Shalley, 2006; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst & Tushman, 
2009; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Established firms like IBM employ hundreds of employees 
dedicated to different types of search (e.g., Dahlander et al., 2016), but entrepreneurs often 
lack the internal differentiation needed to balance market exploration with the needs to keep 
the lights on (March, 1991). Since entrepreneurial firms often lack the in-house knowledge 
and capabilities necessary to both create and launch a novel innovation, they often benefit 
from gaining information from sources external to their firms (e.g., Posen & Chen, 2013).   
Entrepreneurial firms with increased exposure to broad or diverse sources of 
information benefit from a “vision advantage” (Burt, 2004) that provides unique or 
nonredundant information (Granovetter, 1983) that can enhance the identification of 





associated with the generation of novel ideas at the level of the individual and firm (Fleming, 
2001; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Jeppesen and 
Lakhani, 2010; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2010; 
Dahlander, O’Mahony and Gann, 2016). “By accessing a greater number of knowledge 
sources, the firm improves the probability of obtaining knowledge that will lead to a valuable 
outcome” (Leiponen and Helfat 2010: 225).  Thus, entrepreneurial firms benefit from 
drawing upon a broad set of external stakeholders to inform early development of their 
ventures (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Cohen et al., 2018). While broad search can foster 
idea generation in the early stages of entrepreneurship, where divergent thinking is desired, 
many scholars theorize that convergent thinking and collaboration with a few stakeholders is 
what enables the trust needed for execution and implementation of an innovation at a later 
stage (Fleming, Mingo and Chen, 2007; Obstfeld, 2005; Long-Lingo & O’Mahony, 2010). 
The thinking is that once an innovation is developed, the need for broad search dissipates as 
refinement and implementation of an innovation benefits from cohesive collaborations 
(Hansen, 1999; Fleming, Mingo and Chen, 2007; Obstfeld, 2005). Once entrepreneurial 
firms have developed a novel innovation, they face an underappreciated challenge that 
differs from early-stage idea generation: how to penetrate the social systems in which their 
innovations will be used (Rogers, 1983).  
Rather than search for novel ideas to inform concept development (e.g., Seidel and 
O’Mahony, 2014), when entrepreneurs search to learn about the social and political barriers 
that can challenge widespread adoption of novel innovations they engage in a different type 
of search: market search. How entrepreneurs engage in information gathering activities that 





market is not well understood. This can be a problematic journey for entrepreneurs as the 
landscape is rocky. Customers do not always articulate the appropriate course of action to 
achieve market traction (Christenson, 1997) and may have their own agenda. Established 
customers who prefer “high-touch” relationships may seek to influence how a novel 
innovation fits with their precise requirements (Freeman, Harrison & Zyglidopoulos, 2018) 
or manipulate an innovation for their own purposes (Elsbach and Kramer, 2003). Even 
when interests align, the complexity of established customers’ internal processes and 
procedures can divert commitment away from an entrepreneurs’ innovations (Dushnitsky & 
Shaver, 2009; Rogers, 1983). Customers in established market segments may be reticent to 
adopt an innovation that appears too novel (Bingham & Kahl, 2013); too complex (Rogers, 
1983); or that lacks compatibility (Kahl & Grodal, 2016). Market traction can also depend 
upon sourcing information and integrating the interests of a diverse set of stakeholders 
(Rogers, 1983; Adner, 2012). For example, Adner (2012) shows how new innovations such 
as the PAX run-flat tire failed to gain traction as Michelin neglected to address the needs of 
critical stakeholders in the value chain. What is not well understood is how entrepreneurial 
firms search for this type of market information and learn from it.  
Scholars tend to examine learning from two distinct vantages without integrating the 
two. One approach is to examine the sources of learning upstream such as vicarious learning 
(Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Argote 1999, Darr et al. 1995, Ingram and Baum 1997); direct 
learning or learning by doing (Cohen et al., 2018; Bingham and Davis, 2012; Bunderson and 
Reagans 2011; Beckman and Haunschild, 2002; Miner, Bassoff and Moorman, 2001). 
Another approach is to examine the processes or behaviors by which organizations, teams or 





Joseph & Gaba, 2015; Rerup, 2009; Edmondson, 1999; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992). 
Edmondson characterizes learning behaviors as an ongoing process of reflection and action 
where actors, “test assumptions and discuss differences” (1999: 353). For example, scholars 
examine how embracing failure and learning from feedback affects a group’s ability to 
master new tasks (Edmondson, Dillon and Roloff, 2007, Dweck, 2008; Edmondson, 
Bohmer, Pisano, 2001); adopt new innovations (Deichmann & Ende, 2013; Van de Ven & 
Polley, 1992) and perform (Edmondson, 1999; 2002).  
While learning scholars have examined individual, team and firm-level learning 
behaviors (Tucker & Edmondson, 2003; Edmondson, 2002; Schwab, 2007; Bunderson and 
Reagans, 2011; Anderson & Lewis, 2014; Van de Ven and Polley, 1992; Edmondson, Dillon 
and Roloff, 2007), little research considers how learning behaviors displayed downstream 
may be constrained or enabled by the information available upstream. For example, if firms 
are less likely to search diverse external information sources, decision makers may be less 
likely to confront new information that could challenge their beliefs, practices or routines 
and trigger learning. Thus, a firm’s ability to learn from others may not only be a function of 
observed learning behaviors, but also of how firms engage in search and source new 
information that could influence their opportunity to learn.    
 To explain how entrepreneurial firms gain market traction, both approaches are 
necessary. There is much that cannot be learned about the structure or nuance of a market 
without sourcing information from customers, suppliers, and partners in situ (Shah and 
Tripsas, 2007; Nembhard & Tucker, 2011). Yet, market search incurs a cost, detracting from 
other venture development activities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Piezunka and Dahlander, 





invested heavily in their innovation and are expecting to earn a return. At this stage, 
entrepreneurial firms may have limited capacity or resources (Ocasio, 1997; Katila and 
Ahuja, 2002; Cohen et al., 2018) to draw upon to conduct market search and adapt their 
innovations. If entrepreneurial firms are founded to seek emancipation from constraints 
(Rindova, Barry & Ketchen, 2009), they may be unwilling to adapt innovations in response 
to feedback from external stakeholders. What is needed is field research that unpacks how 
entrepreneurial firms conduct and learn from search in their efforts to gain market traction. 
Methods 
As theory on the entrepreneurial processes in the messy middle of venture 
development is underdeveloped, I used an inductive grounded theory approach 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Locke, 2002), which enabled the “discovery of theory from 
data systematically obtained and analyzed in social research” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967:1). I 
sought to examine how entrepreneurs at a common stage; in a common field; with access to 
a common set of external stakeholders; made progress gaining market traction. This kind of 
“how”, process-based research question is best suited for field research where 
contemporaneous observation of entrepreneurial firms and their interactions with external 
stakeholders can be observed in situ over time (Becker, 1963; Langley, 1999; 2008; Langley, 
Smallman, Tsoukas, Van de Ven, 2013). I leverage data collected over the first 15 months of 
my study, while the first cohort of 28 firms participated in the Cure accelerator program.  
Table 3 relays descriptive data about these 28 firms.  
Data Analysis. My analytic approach followed an iterative process of developing 
grounded themes and working concepts to explain how entrepreneurial firms strove to gain 





field notes by firm (Locke, 2002) and engaged in open coding (Charmaz, 2006; Locke, 2002) 
to understand the challenges entrepreneurial firms encountered when attempting to gain 
market traction. I identified three common challenges: (1) identifying paying customers; (2) 
prioritizing market requirements; and (2) adapting innovations to fit customers’ unique 
operating environments. This prompted us to examine the activities entrepreneurial firms 
used to navigated these challenges (e.g., Langley et al., 2013).  
Phase 1: Search Approach. As a first step, I focused on how entrepreneurial firms 
interacted with external stakeholders and noted variance in the types of questions firms 
asked of those they met with. I then engaged in focused coding (Charmaz, 2006) and 
analyzed five to ten exchanges conducted by each entrepreneurial firm with external 
stakeholders such as peers, customers, mentors, and advisors. An exchange included the 
initiation of a conversation with an external stakeholder and the back and forth interaction 
that occurred as an entrepreneur attempted to engage with that person. These interactions 
usually surfaced feedback which I defined as: information shared by external stakeholders 
with implications for the commercial success of firms’ digital innovations. Entrepreneurs 
differed as to whether they initiated exchanges by asking questions to further deal making 
(can you buy my innovation?); by gaining validation (does this innovation address your 
needs?); or by seeking contextual understanding (what needs do you have?). I coded these 
differences and then observed that while some entrepreneurial firms initiated interactions 
with a breadth of external stakeholders, others searched more selectively and did not reach 
out to their cohort members to acquire feedback and advice. “They held their cards close” as 
shared by NUDGE, a behavioral support company. Following Dahlander, O’Mahony and 





staff, customers, peers or subject matter experts to more narrowly with only those who 
could initiate deals.  
Feedback acquired through search could highlight either opportunities or problems 
(e.g., Kirtley & O’Mahony, 2019), but this distinction did not affect how entrepreneurs 
responded to feedback. As suggested by Perry-Smith & Mannucci (2017), I coded the 
valence of feedback (positive or negative), but, did not identify any discernible patterns. I did 
notice a difference in how entrepreneurs responded to concrete and ambiguous feedback. 
Concrete feedback clearly specified issues or offered a prescribed suggestion, while 
ambiguous feedback was difficult to interpret and offered no clear prescribed solution (e.g., 
Daft & Weick, 1984). For example, when an insurance firm advised MDCOR to change 
aspects of how their data was modeled to comply with their privacy rules, I coded this as 
concrete feedback. The insurance firm raised a clear, discrete issue that MDCOR would 
need to revise in their technical product to ink a deal. In contrast, when a mentor 
commented that NUDGE’s user-interface “fell-flat”, but did not articulate how to fix it, I 
coded this as ambiguous feedback. I coded which entrepreneurial firms received concrete 
and ambiguous feedback and how they prioritized feedback. 
 Phase 2: Learning Approach. Rather than face a scarcity of feedback, many of the 
entrepreneurial firms I studied were overwhelmed by an abundance of feedback – not all of 
it was immediately understandable (e.g., Joseph & Gaba, 2015). More puzzling, I observed 
some entrepreneurial firms ignore the feedback they received. Thus, I turned to theories of 
learning behavior (Edmondson, 1999), that show how the practices firms engage in to 
process new information shape learning and subsequent performance. I coded eight 





feedback, deflecting feedback, conceding to feedback, acknowledging feedback, reframing 
feedback, translating ambiguous feedback, discovering new opportunities and redirecting 
feedback. While entrepreneurial firms occasionally utilized practices outside of this set, I only 
considered practices to be dominant when they appeared multiple times. For example, 
CORDCAR used a practice of “delaying” their response to feedback provided by one 
customer, but only utilized this practice once, and we did not observe other firms utilizing 
this practice. Thus, this was not considered a dominant practice.  
When entrepreneurial firms minimized feedback, they dismissed the relevance of 
learning from feedback and the need to revise their product. Entrepreneurial firms deflected 
feedback when they pushed back and argued against the validity of the feedback, rather than 
learn from it. When entrepreneurial firms conceded to feedback, they revised their products 
even if these changes incurred costs. When acknowledging feedback, entrepreneurial firms 
admitted the validity of feedback, without revising their product. When entrepreneurial firms 
reframed feedback, they learned about technical challenges to their innovation and revised 
their target market without making changes to their innovation. When translating feedback, 
entrepreneurs converted ambiguous feedback into a familiar lens to foster mutual learning 
(e.g., Carlile, 2004). When redirecting feedback, entrepreneurial firms steered stakeholders’ 
attention away from feedback that could prove irrelevant or time consuming, toward 
learning of new sources of value. When entrepreneurs collaborated with external 
stakeholders to learn how their existing innovation could be repurposed to address new 
applications, I coded this as discovering new opportunities.  
After identifying all of the practices each firm used to make sense of external 





compare and contrast practices utilized by our cohort of 28 firms identifying three distinct 
patterns. In creating this matrix, I noticed a temporal order to how practices were used. For 
example, firms that minimized feedback, then deflected feedback and only conceded to 
feedback when the first two practices were not effective. This led me to explore developing a 
process model to relay the temporal order in which practices were used.  
Phase 3: Mapping the Process of Market Search. I quickly realized that the differences 
among our firms were too large to be encompassed in one model. Informed by the variance 
identified in the practice matrix, we developed three process models to explain different 
ways entrepreneurial firms engage in market search: transactional, confirmatory and 
diagnostic. We reassessed all firms’ search and learning across five dimensions in a rough 
temporal sequence: 1) entrepreneurs’ search approach (questions asked during search); 2) 
search breadth (selective vs broad); 3) dominant type of feedback received (concrete vs 
ambiguous; 4) type of feedback prioritized (concrete vs ambiguous); and 5) learning practices 
for all 28 entrepreneurial firms4.  
I coded firms as conducting transactional search when they asked questions such as: 
Are you a decision maker? will you buy this? and when they searched selectively, only 
interacting with stakeholders who they thought could sign deals. These firms tried to initially 
minimize or deflect feedback, but ultimately conceded to revising their products to address 
customer concerns.  
 
4 We considered if qualitative comparative analysis would produce additional insight, but because we 
did not know the defining outcomes of interest ex-ante, QCA was not well suited to further our 
analysis (Greckhamer, Furnari, Fiss, Aguilera, 2018). We realized that the temporal order of search 






I coded firms as conducting confirmatory search when they asked question such as: 
what need does this innovation address? Confirmatory searchers conducted broad search but 
learned selectively, acknowledging and reframing feedback without revising their product.  
I coded firms as conducting diagnostic search whey they asked questions like: what 
are your most pressing needs? to understanding the context in which their innovation would 
be implemented. Diagnostic searchers conducted broad search and engaged in mutual 
learning by translating ambiguity and redirecting feedback to identify new opportunities.  
Phase 4: Progress Toward Market Traction. After mapping these three processes, I 
revaluated the objectives entrepreneurs had for their ventures and how they addressed the 
challenges they faced over the course of our study. I identified three ways entrepreneurial 
firms made progress: (1) cultivating a vetted pipeline of customers; (2) adapting their target 
market; and (3) growing new sources of revenue. When entrepreneurial firms cultivated a 
vetted customer pipeline, they expanded their network to include new potential customers 
and partners. Entrepreneurial firms also made progress by either narrowing or expanding 
their target market. Growing new sources of revenue involved actually closing a deal with a 
new, revenue bearing customer.  
Phase 5: A Grounded Theoretical Model of Market Search. Next, I returned to the literature 
and revisited our data to assess the relationships between entrepreneurial search and learning 
and the type of progress made. I did this analysis two ways. First, we compared all firms 
along dimensions of search and learning. I moved back and forth between firm level data 
and comparative tables to understand how search and learning produced different types of 
progress. Second, working from the three process models, I compared commonalities and 





Neither search nor learning practices alone explained variation in progress, but rather the 
combination.  
SEARCH FOR A MARKET: HOW ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS GAIN 
MARKET TRACTION  
Despite facing common challenges, the entrepreneurs I studied pursued different 
approaches to gaining traction by engaging in market search: information gathering activities 
that probed whether an innovation could be successfully adapted to meet the need of a 
specific market. Despite the fact that all entrepreneurial firms were at a similar stage with 
viable digital health innovations and all had access to similar resources, I observed three 
different market search processes: transactional, confirmatory and diagnostic. After 
explaining how these three processes unfolded, I offer a grounded explanation of how 
market search influenced the types of progress entrepreneurial firms made toward gaining 
market traction.  
Transactional Searchers. Nine out of 28 entrepreneurial firms engaged primarily in 
transactional search, seeking selective exchange solely with customers to foster deal making 
as shown in Table 4.  
Transactional searchers queried promising contacts to discover when they could 
demo their innovations; if NDA’s (non-disclosure agreements) were needed to initiate deal-
making; and who could sign an MOU (memorandum of understanding). The questions that 
drove search were focused narrowly on understanding what was needed to “ink a deal” 
rather than validating how their digital innovations could meet customer needs. For 
example, CORDCAR, a firm that had developed a patient application to coordinate acute 





on the likelihood of gaining “deal intel”: “We don’t go to these events to learn about the 
industry. We go to get deal intel”. At one event, we observed the CORDCAR CEO 
nonchalantly walking the event floor. Yet, prior to the event, I found him in the Cure office 
practicing how to source budgetary information from select event-attendees and how to 
disengage from “less productive conversations” to save time. I noticed him put this 
technique to work when he feigned an important call from his wife to avoid a conversation 
when it stopped yielding deal related information.  
 Firms engaged in transactional search sourced information selectively, only from 
what they considered to be high potential contacts without triangulating with their cohort, 
Cure staff or other stakeholders. PACK, a company that created customized pharmaceutical 
pill packs purposefully focused on targeted customers and avoided interacting with either 
their cohort or other stakeholders. Tom, a founder of PACK, shared why:  
[At Cure] there is an amazing collection or wellspring of resources for 
entrepreneurs, more than anyone could ever take advantage of. And we 
navigate carefully. We selectively neglected our peers and the [Cure] staff to 
focus on engaging with people from organizations who can make deals. You 
have to make it [making deals] your total focus and filter everything else out.  
 
Despite acknowledging the abundance of expertise at Cure, Tom believed that seeking 
feedback from peers and experts would take his team off track. Another founder from 
PACK viewed information sourced from peers and Cure staff as potentially dangerous: 
“You can’t find out how best to approach a given customer by asking other startups. They 
don’t really understand what you are doing so, they might give bad advice.” As stated by 
PACK, “You have to triple check everything you get from a startup. Even if there is no ill 
intent.” Even when another cohort member had experience working with a common 





startup creating concussion diagnostic software, had worked with an insurance company 
with which PACK wanted to partner. However, PACK intentionally never asked QUICKD 
about their experience with this insurance company as PACK did not want to waste time 
sharing their venture plans and did not value the information offered by QUICKD. “We did 
not want to go through the process of sharing information about our venture, listening 
about their [QUICKD] venture, to get likely irrelevant information about [the insurer].” The 
PACK team believed any “information” QUICKD could provide would be erroneous or 
“likely irrelevant”. Firms like PACK attempted to maximize search efficiency by going 
directly to a source without triangulating or drawing upon the other resources made available 
at Cure: “To bypass all of this [search effort] quickly, you have to ask the customer directly.”  
Entrepreneurial firms engaged in transactional search were not interested in learning 
from people they did not think capable of signing deals and thus received feedback only 
from the select few they believed to be decision makers. They searched narrowly and 
typically received feedback in the form of detailed concrete requests required to work with a 
particular customer rather than insight on the complexities of a customers’ operating 
environment. A hospital CEO reflected on their exchange with CORDCAR:   
They came to us in a very specific way. To sign a contract for a paid pilot 
which we could convert to a full contract. We had some very specific things 
they had to do to run a pilot with us, and of course they needed to figure out 
how it aligned with our strategic priorities, which we were clear about. They 
were going to have to change their product around to meet those priorities.  
 
However, the custom changes this hospital CEO asked for conflicted with CORDCAR’s 
current product in use at other customer sites. Adapting to the changes the CEO requested 
would make a single integrated product difficult to produce. Concrete feedback like this was 





what was required to satisfy a particular executive, but it did not help CORDCAR learn 
about the needs of the larger organization or the market.  
As shown in Table 4, entrepreneurial firms engaged in transactional search enacted 
three learning practices when processing the feedback gained from search: minimizing feedback, 
deflecting feedback, and conceding to feedback. I detail how MDCOR, a firm developing care 
coordination software for patients with co-morbidities (e.g., cancer and diabetes), leveraged 
these three practices. MDCOR received feedback from an insurer that they needed to 
capture and track “three more data points”. MDCOR was dismayed as they would not only 
have to purchase the requested data points, but also redeploy resources from other projects 
to reprogram their software. When a hospital had raised the same point earlier, MDCOR 
effectively minimized this feedback by arguing that it would be costly for the hospital to 
maintain the data and dissuaded the hospital from insisting on “three more data points”. 
When MDCOR later heard this same feedback repeated by an insurer, they attempted to 
minimize the feedback again by downplaying the importance of the “three data points” to 
avoid making costly revisions to their innovation, but the insurer persisted in requesting the 
data.  
When minimizing feedback failed with this insurer, MDCOR argued that the 
insurer’s request for three more data points was “customized, specialized, one-off” and tried 
to deflect this feedback by arguing that other insurers would not require these data. 
However, MDCOR had not searched broadly to learn if their arguments were true. “They 
basically called us on our bull-shit. We didn’t really know [if what they were asking for was 
standard]. They had views on what was required. And they were not going to help us get this 





deflected feedback, they failed to learn more about stakeholders’ concerns and advanced 
arguments to convince the other party to drop requests to change their innovation. After 
minimizing and deflecting the feedback that three more data points were needed to no avail, 
MDCOR finally conceded to the insurer’s request and revised their product: pulling three 
full-time people off a separate project to add the requested three data points. “At first, we 
thought, we could get it done quick. But no. not at all.” Even with the three data points, 
iteration led to iteration without financial commitment from the insurer: “we invested 6 
months of work, and did tons of iterations to our product, but we didn’t get paid.” MDCOR 
had invested in revisions based on the feedback gained from selective search without 
engaging more broadly with the insurer and other stakeholders to understand what was really 
required to integrate with the insurer’s system. Even after revising their product to include 
the requested data points, MDCOR could not convince the insurance company to commit 
to a deal. Transactional searchers like MDCOR became frustrated, caught in a “custom 
trap”, iterating on concrete technicalities in the hope of signing a deal. 
Like CORDCAR, MDCOR provides a good example of transactional market search. 
Fearful of wasting time, these 9 firms searched selectively and sought exchange with only 
targeted customers who might further deals, to the neglect of other stakeholders who might 
have been able to share relevant information. This selective approach surfaced concrete 
feedback that could trigger revision of their innovations which entrepreneurs tried to avoid 
by either minimizing or deflecting feedback. When minimizing and deflecting feedback 
practices were not effective in placating potential customers, transactional searchers 
conceded by revising their innovations based on the limited information learned from 





to the concrete feedback they received but, were often frustrated when these practices 
produced costly and unproductive cycles of iteration without the promise of revenue.  
Confirmatory Search. Firms engaged in confirmatory search (9 out of 28) sought 
validation of their innovations with a broad set of stakeholders, rather than just seeking deals 
with customers. For example, DEVICEPACK had created a platform to enable efficient 
fulfillment of joint implants in time for surgeries which, to be effective, would need to 
interoperate with medical device suppliers’ systems. DEVICEPACK sought hospital CIOs 
to validate their reliance on a particular technical standard, rather than to directly elicit a deal. 
Confirmatory searchers searched broadly to learn how their innovations could fit with 
market requirements. DEVICEPACK spent significant time with diverse stakeholders such 
as insurers, hospital executives and medical device companies to design a pilot test to 
confirm that their innovation could reduce costs for different types of customer 
organizations using an emerging technology standard. While transactional searchers like 
PACK relied on a selective set of customers to inform their search, confirmatory searchers 
engaged in broad search to validate their assumptions about their product’s ability to meet 
market needs.  
For example, NUDGE engaged with diverse external stakeholders, even those not 
capable of making deals, such as a retired insurance executive, to learn how their application 
would meet the needs of their target market: opioid addiction recovery patients. The retired 
executive was wary about how NUDGE would demonstrate sustained adoption of their 
opioid recovery mobile application: “He is nervous that addicts might lose their phones 
often, which is totally a belief of his and not scientifically proven. We know the stats on this 





that “opioid addicts” could not be serviced with a mobile application was valid. Over the 
next two weeks, NUDGE founders attempted to triangulate whether the concerns shared by 
this retired executive were reasonable, by querying the Cure program director and other 
cohort members. “We wanted to know what this guy was really like? Did he actually know 
anything?” Everyone thought the executive was “solid, a good guy, smart, knowledgeable.”  
Compared with transactional searchers, broad search and triangulation helped 
confirmatory searchers obtain more varied types of feedback: opening up ambiguities as to 
how external stakeholders might evaluate and deploy their innovation in varied contexts. 
Broad search unearthed ambiguous feedback, but entrepreneurs engaged in confirmatory 
search were selective in how they learned from feedback; prioritizing what they could 
understand and ignoring what was not clear. Whereas concrete feedback offered a specific 
concern or request, ambiguous feedback raised questions with no clear cut solution. 
Confirmatory searchers ignored ambiguous feedback that they feared would waste time or 
make them look uninformed in the eyes of their prospective customers. As DEVICEPACK 
explained, they tried “to avoid stuff that was vague and they [customers] really hadn’t made 
up their minds about. If you focus on the unclear stuff it can really put you at risk for 
looking like you don’t understand [a customer’s] needs. And well, it takes time sorting out 
what it is they want.” Confirmatory searchers felt more confident addressing concrete 
feedback using two practices: acknowledging and reframing feedback.  
For example, when NUDGE engaged a potential customer about conducting a 
clinical pilot, they shared concerns similar to those expressed by the retired insurance 
executive about opioid addiction and mobile phone usage. The founders of NUDGE 





some in-person tracking process and adjust the way we technically track adherence. We 
know they think that. We heard it before”.  Instead of exploring how their application could 
be adapted to track patients through other means, NUDGE reframed the feedback they 
received to revise their target market to fit their existing product – without revising their 
product. If patients in early stages of opioid recovery were not reliable phone owners, then 
NUDGE would target patients in later stages of recovery, where phone ownership would be 
less problematic. NUDGE hoped to convince the hospital that adding “in person tracking” 
was not necessary for their revised target market. The problem was that the market for late- 
stage opioid recovery was smaller than the market for all stages of recovery. NUDGE’s 
response to the feedback they received from broad search was to narrow their target market 
rather than revise their innovation. In the end, NUDGE’s rescoping efforts were not 
effective as this hospital was not interested in a solution that addressed only a small portion 
of the opioid recovery market.  
Rather than the selective search prized by transactional searchers, confirmatory 
searchers engaged broadly to triangulate the feedback they received to understand how their 
innovation could fit market needs. Their search surfaced both ambiguous and concrete 
feedback, but when customers shared feedback that was unclear, confirmatory searchers did 
not explore further to see what could be learned. Confirmatory searchers acknowledged the 
concrete feedback produced by broad search, but were not eager to adapt their innovations 
in response. Instead, they reframed the feedback and narrowed the target market their 
innovation addressed without revisiting their product’s core assumptions.  
Diagnostic Search. Ten out of 28 entrepreneurial firms pursued diagnostic search 





needs. Like confirmatory searchers, diagnostic searchers interacted with a broad set of peers, 
experts, and customers. In contrast with confirmatory searchers, diagnostic searchers sought 
to understand what was important to customers without seeking confirmation of their 
innovations. External stakeholders were not always clear about how their healthcare 
challenges could be addressed by new digital innovations. For example, a pharmaceutical 
executive shared that they [healthcare executives], “Often had ideas, but also weren’t totally 
sure how digital technologies would change their business and the industry at large. So, there 
were opportunities for entrepreneurs to really help.” What distinguished diagnostic searchers 
from confirmatory searchers was their openness to learn from ambiguous feedback and their 
willingness to explore substantive changes to their innovations.  
Diagnostic searchers were comfortable ‘opening the hood’ of their innovations and 
managing ambiguity as to what their innovations could do even if it posed some financial or 
impression management risk to them. Ambiguous feedback was initially difficult to engage 
with as it opened entrepreneurial firms up to stakeholders’ perceptions of indecision, 
weakness or lack of knowledge. As shared by a hospital executive, “Of course we are open, 
but they need to get our concerns and be quick about how they are going to handle them.” 
This was the type of feedback confirmatory searchers such as DEVICEPACK avoided and 
labeled as “vague stuff” that could put “you at risk for looking like you don’t understand [a 
customer’s] needs”. Decoding ambiguous feedback required joint problem solving on the 
part of the entrepreneurial firm and customers. For example, a pharmaceutical company 
appreciated QUICKD’s virtual reality technology which tracked eye dilation and visual 
attention to diagnose concussions, but had other ideas about how they would apply it. 





their virtual reality technology might be repurposed. QUICKD engaged with this 
pharmaceutical company to further pursue this new opportunity even though it took time to 
untangle and did not immediately result in deal making. By collaborating with this 
pharmaceutical company, QUICKD discovered a new way to repurpose their technology 
that would enlarge their market scope.  
Entrepreneurial firms conducting diagnostic search were willing to engage with 
ambiguity and learn by translating feedback, redirecting feedback and discovering new 
opportunities. We detail how two firms, DIETAP and INSTRUCT, leveraged these 
practices to conduct diagnostic market search. To untangle ambiguous feedback, diagnostic 
searchers first translated it into the familiar. I observed the founders of DIETAP a digital 
nutrition programs for patients with diabetes and other ailments, animatedly in discussion 
with a group of insurance executives in a Cure conference room. One of the founders drew 
a small circle on the white board, “this is what we know.” He drew a massive circle to the 
right of the small circle, “this is what we don’t know or aren’t quite sure about. If we just 
focus on what we know, and go back and forth on these small things, where you think one 
thing, and well, we kinda think something else, we are not going to tackle these bigger things, 
that you [the customer] and I don’t really know the answer to”. The founder of DIETAP 
then proceeded to translate ambiguity as endemic to the process of innovation. “Tackling 
the things that are less clear, that is what innovators do. It is part of the process.” DIETAP 
did not use this approach in an uninformed way. Through broad search, DIETAP had 
learned that these executives were highly educated scientists and DIETAP leveraged this 
knowledge in a persuasive way. Drawing on their customer’s identification with the scientific 





ambiguous by making the unknown a collective problem that, together, they could solve. 
After the meeting with DIETAP, a medical device executive present identified with 
DIETAP’s approach: “we are innovators at [medical device company]. That is why we are 
here, that is what my group does. So, we totally get it.” In subsequent meetings, DIETAP 
secured talent from this firm to help develop a new application for their technology and was 
awarded a contract to run a pilot.  
Second, diagnostic searchers engaged both broadly and deeply with stakeholders to 
discover new opportunities. A renowned hospital gave INSTRUCT feedback that their 
digital pre-operative instruction application was “too narrow”. INSTRUCT founders did not 
know how to make sense of this feedback. “Narrow” could refer to their venture’s feature 
set, the comprehensiveness of the pre-operative instructions they offered, or the range of 
surgical procedures covered. To learn more, the founders of INSTRUCT designed a 
collaborative workshop with hospital executives to probe where the hospital’s true needs lay. 
INSTRUCT learned that the hospital would gain more value with post-operative patient 
education – as this was a costlier problem for the hospital than pre-operative. Although lack 
of adherence to pre-operative instructions triggered the rescheduling of surgery — a missed 
revenue opportunity, inattention to post-operative instructions impacted surgical outcomes, 
triggering return visits which threatened the hospital’s reimbursement. This was a new 
insight for both the hospital and INSTRUCT. As a result, INSTRUCT agreed to, with the 
hospital’s support, broaden the scope of their innovation — to include not only pre-
operative instructions but also post-operative instructions.  
As INSTRUCT began collaborating with hospital staff to understand the process of 





compliance with both pre and post-operative instructions that spanned hospital departments 
and were previously unappreciated. The INSTRUCT team became valued internally for this 
expertise. One of the founders shared: “What we do for this procedure could easily be 
applied to other areas.” In this manner, INSTRUCT learned how they could add value in 
ways that grew their target market for their innovation. INSTRUCT was later able to apply 
this expertise and gain additional customers, furthering market traction. Unlike transactional 
or confirmatory searchers, diagnostic searchers were willing to engage in ambiguous 
feedback and revisit the assumptions underlying their innovations to discover new 
opportunities rather than just iterate on their existing product or revise their target market. 
Diagnostic searchers learned how to convince the stakeholders they interacted with to join 
them on a journey into the unknown as only they knew what their technologies were capable 
of, while only customers knew where value could best be created.  
Lastly, when entrepreneurs redirected feedback, they shifted customers attention 
away from concrete requests to customize their innovation, towards mutual discovery of 
new opportunities. For example, the same insurance executives that engaged in open 
discussions in the conference room had also requested that DIETAP add tools that could 
share and integrate patient weight loss data into the insurer’s system to track compliance and 
health over time. This was data DIETAP collected but did not want to share with a third 
party due to privacy concerns and existing commitments to users. Moreover, DIETAP did 
not want to reconfigure their data to integrate with this single insurer’s system. Instead of 
minimizing, deflecting or reframing this concrete feedback, DIETAP redirected the 
insurance executives’ attention towards “tackling these bigger things” that might result in a 





resources needed to customize their innovation in response to every customer request but 
were dependent upon customers’ approval and cooperation to further market traction.  
Explaining Variation in Entrepreneurial Market Search  
I observed entrepreneurial firms making three types of progress toward market 
traction: 1) cultivating a vetted customer pipeline, 2) adapting their target market and 3) 
growing new sources of revenue. These three types of progress were accumulative as I did 
not have any entrepreneurial firms that grew new sources of revenue without also cultivating 
a vetted customer pipeline and refining their target market. Cultivating a customer pipeline 
was important to entrepreneurs’ own sense of progress as this signaled their building 
awareness of their innovations with critical customers – a critical antecedent to market 
traction (Rogers, 1983). Vetted networks also position entrepreneurial firms to achieve 
longer term positive outcomes (Hallen, 2008; Cohen et al., 2018). I also observed 
entrepreneurial firms’ adapting their target market and they considered this a sign of 
progress as it helped their innovations become more compatible with the market. The 
compatibility of an innovation is often perceived by members of a social system as positive 
to its rate of adoption (Rogers, 1983: 234). Growing new sources of revenue was for the 
entrepreneurs I studied the holy grail and involved closing a deal with a paying customer. 
This was not only a signal of progress as it increased the financial viability of the venture, but 
also, showed that the entrepreneur had cleared a path to integrate a digital health innovation 
into an established organization. A signed revenue deal reflected a customer’s progression 
from awareness to persuasion to decision (Rogers, 1983). Table 5 shows how the 28 firms in 
our study made progress along these three dimensions.  





their search, all 28 firms cultivated a vetted pipeline of customers: Transactional searchers 
increased their access to select healthcare executives; while confirmatory and diagnostic 
searchers increased the breadth and depth of existing and new customer relationships. All 
firms entered the study with an idea of their target customer, but vetted those ideas through 
market search. A vetted customer pipeline reflected the progress entrepreneurs made by 
learning from search: identifying which customers lacked the interest or resources to pay for 
their innovation and which could be considered potential customers.  For example, the CEO 
of OPSIGNAL shared: “We dedicate a lot of efforts, sifting through leads at the top of a 
funnel, to a very targeted set of customers. Getting to a pipeline of targeted customers helps 
us understand where to dedicate our time.” Cultivation reflected the work of market search: 
learning where digital innovations could be more readily received.    
Adapting Target Market. The 9 transactional searchers, like CORDCAR and MDCOR, 
who engaged in selective search, did not significantly revise their target market during the 
time of study. All of the entrepreneurial firms who learned from broad search (both 
confirmatory and diagnostic searchers), adapted their target market over time. It is possible 
broad search produced more information to drive adaptation of entrepreneurs’ target 
market, but the direction of that adaptation was informed by how entrepreneurs prioritized 
and responded to ambiguous feedback. As shown in the case of NUDGE and 
DEVICEPACK, the nine entrepreneurial firms engaged in confirmatory search prioritized 
feedback they could understand and narrowed their target market to fit their existing 
product. For example, when SENSOR learned that their remote monitoring device would 





doesn’t make sense to change all the technical functionality of our product to meet our 
originally intended market [hospitals], we can however just narrow our market”. In contrast, 
the 10 diagnostic searchers, like QUICKD and INSTRUCT, all expanded their target market 
– by engaging in joint problem solving with customers and other stakeholders on ambiguous 
feedback to learn of new opportunities where their innovations could be applied.  
Growing New Sources of Revenue. Only the ten entrepreneurial firms engaged in 
diagnostic search acquired new sources of revenue during the time of study: new revenue 
producing contracts with new customers. Often these deals produced not only revenue, but 
also covered the expenses for pilots, trials or tests. For example, when INSTRUCT was 
awarded a pilot with a notable Boston hospital, all of the costs were absorbed by the hospital 
and INSTRUCT was also paid for the use of their innovation. As INSTRUCT shared: “We 
are on our way with a meaningful pilot that will expand the relevance of our business.”  
Neither transactional nor confirmatory searchers acquired new sources of revenue during the 
time of study. Transactional searchers were disappointed when their efforts to revise their 
innovations were not rewarded with customer contracts, but produced cycles of unfunded 
iteration. For example, CORDCAR conceded to feedback triggering many iterations to their 
innovation in advance of a revenue commitment from a customer. Confirmatory searchers 
narrowed their target market but, in doing so, also reduced their relevance for customers. 
For example, after revising the target market for their opioid recovery application to focus 
on late-stage patients, NUDGE failed to acquire new sources of revenue despite repeated 
conversations with stakeholders who initially saw promise in the application. 





to the literature to consider theoretical explanations for the variation I observed. First, did 
firms harbor different strategic objectives that might explain differences in market search?5 Scholars 
disagree as to how entrepreneurs vary in their motivations: while some seek autonomy from 
employment (Rindova, Barry, Ketchen, Jr., 2009); others seek exits (Guzman & Stern, 2015). 
Thus, I recoded each firms’ application data to assess what motivated entrepreneurial firms’ 
search. In doing so I discovered, that the 28 firms I studied shared two common objectives: 
1) developing opportunities to conduct a paid pilot with a customer; and 2) acquiring new 
customers. I did not discern any differences in what firms aimed to accomplish upon entry 
to the study that might explain the variation observed — all entrepreneurs sought revenue 
producing contracts with customers.  
Second, did differences in entrepreneurial firm characteristics influence their search process? Many 
scholars have studied how founding team demographics influence entrepreneurial outcomes 
(Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). Drawing on this literature, I evaluated founder gender, education, 
occupation, team size and firm quality to assess if any of these characteristics were associated 
with different search processes as shown in Table 7. I did not find any strong patterns that 
would influence entrepreneurial firms’ search process. I did find a slight association between 
entrepreneurial firms pursuing confirmatory search and female CEOs and entrepreneurial 
firms pursuing transactional search and male CEOs. Entrepreneurial firms pursuing 
diagnostic search were associated with founders with an advanced degree. This suggests that 
advanced education could foster joint the problem solving that drove diagnostic search, yet, 
I caution against over inferring from slight differences observed in a small sample.  
 





I also analyzed each firms’ investment and revenue at entry to the study to assess 
whether firms with “higher quality” were more likely to exhibit certain search or learning 
practices than firms with “lower quality” (e.g., Guzman and Stern, 2015; Kerr, Nanda & 
Rhodes-Kropf, 2014). Neither investment levels nor revenue generated upon entry to the 
study explained the observed variation in market search. This suggests that the challenges of 
gaining initial access to resources may differ from the challenges of navigating the messy 
middle.  
Since existing theoretical explanations did not help explain the variation I observed, I 
developed three theoretically grounded process models that explained how each market 
search path unfolded. To do so, I mapped each firms’ objectives and challenges; search 
questions; search breadth; feedback received and prioritized, feedback responses and the 
types of progress made. Neither entrepreneurial firms’ search nor learning practices alone 
explained the variation observed, but, rather the combination: how entrepreneurial firms 
learned from search. Figure 4 presents all three market search models side by side to permit 
comparison.  
Transactional.  When entrepreneurial firms conducted transactional market search, 
they sought efficient exchange with a select set of contacts, querying decision makers if they 
could and would buy their innovation. This could be counterproductive, as narrow search 
truncated the information available to learn and prevented triangulation across different 
types of stakeholders that could reveal broader needs within and across large customer 
organizations. Transactional searchers tried to respond to the concrete feedback they 
received by minimizing or deflecting it, but often ended up conceding and revising their 





a customer’s needs as articulated by a few, but not the needs of the broader organization – 
where decision making on new technology purchases could be distributed and unpredictable. 
Transactional searchers did not revise their target market, but made progress cultivating a 
vetted pipeline, increasing their access to select healthcare executives.  
Confirmatory. Confirmatory searchers recognized the need for broad search to validate 
their innovations, asking: what need does this innovation address? While confirmatory 
searchers triangulated across diverse search sources, they selectively learned from broad 
search. These entrepreneurs received a bevy of concrete and ambiguous feedback, but they 
prioritized concrete feedback that they understood, guided by the belief that focusing on 
ambiguous feedback could waste their time. Confirmatory searchers acknowledged the 
validity of the feedback they received but, rather than adapt their innovations to address 
concrete customer requests, they reframed the feedback and adapted their target market to 
fit their existing innovation. In doing so, they narrowed their market scope in ways that were 
less appealing to the customers they targeted. Confirmatory searchers cultivated a vetted 
customer pipeline and narrowed their target market, but did not grow new sources of 
revenue.  
Diagnostic. When entrepreneurial firms engaged in diagnostic market search, they 
searched broadly, engaging in joint problem solving with potential customers and other 
stakeholders, asking: What are your most pressing needs? Who participates in decision 
making? These open-ended questions prompted both ambiguous and concrete feedback. 
But rather than prioritize concrete feedback as confirmatory searchers did, diagnostic 
searchers translated ambiguous feedback, to learn what customers valued. Like confirmatory 





customize their innovation. Instead of conceding to costly iterations like transactional 
searchers or narrowing their target market like confirmatory searchers, diagnostic searchers 
redirected concrete feedback toward discovering new opportunities that leveraged their 
innovation6. What distinguished diagnostic market search was an approach of mutual 
learning and a willingness to translate ambiguity to collaboratively craft new opportunities in 
ways that leveraged entrepreneurs’ existing innovation. Not only did diagnostic searchers 
cultivate a vetted customer pipeline, they also learned what customers valued which helped 
them expand the relevance of their innovation for customers and gain market traction. 
GAINING ORGANIZATIONAL ADOPTION: DISCOVERING NEW USES FOR 
EXISTING INNOVATIONS 
Research proposes two perspectives relevant to how entrepreneurial firms might 
foster organizational adoption of their innovations as they grow. One approach suggests that 
as entrepreneurs gain traction with customers, they progressively focus on building scale 
(Desantola & Gulati, 2017). Scaling involves putting processes, organizational structures, and 
human resources in place to generate replicable outputs; reduce production costs, and 
increase sales without incurring significant additional costs (Chandler, 1990). The implication 
for the adoption process is as entrepreneurial firms grow, they transition away from 
techniques such as giving products away for free, customizing offerings based on customer 
requests, or selling products at a loss. For example, as Eisenmann and Wagonfeld (2012) 
explain, in the early stages of Responsys, a cloud computing company, the firm always 
 
6 As shown in Table 6, two other firms engaged in confirmatory search (HEARTBEAT and 
CONTENTVR) also discovered new opportunities for their innovation but they did not acquire new 
sources of revenue, possibly because they did not use other practices associated with diagnostic 





agreed to make ad hoc customizations, even if costly to accommodate. But as the firm grew, 
these decisions were made through formalized channels, where managers vetted costs and 
benefits before committing to a change. Thus, to generate scalable growth, firms increasingly 
focus on fostering adoption for a standardized set of offerings leading to revenue generation. 
Without some semblance of standardized offerings and reoccurring streams of revenue, it is 
difficult for firms to develop the routinized internal processes, activity systems and 
structures that are often affiliated with scaling (Chandler, 1990; Wheelwright and Hayes, 
1985).  
Another stream of literature suggests that in infancy, entrepreneurial firms face a 
liability of newness as their prospective track record is highly uncertain (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
To mitigate this uncertainty and attract resources, firms engage in symbolic actions such as 
zealous responsiveness to customers, commitments to adapt innovations based on investor 
feedback, and portray narratives which allay fears regarding founders’ experience (Zott & 
Huy, 2007; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Entrepreneurial firms developing novel innovations, 
face a double liability as they not only must legitimize their firms, but also their innovations. 
Building legitimacy for an innovation involves positioning it as comparable to competitors’ 
offerings (Navis & Glynn, 2010), familiar to customers (Douglas & Hargadon, 2001; Kahl & 
Grodal, 2016) and compatible with systems or processes adopting organizations have in 
place, as “most innovations that are higher in perceived compatibility have a more rapid rate 
of adoption” (Rogers, 1983, pg. 227). The inference for the adoption process is as 
entrepreneurial firms progress, they cease to engage in symbolic actions, that built legitimacy 
in infancy (e.g., Fisher et al., 2016) and increasingly differentiate their innovation from 





Eisenhardt (2009) showed that to gain dominance in the internet commerce market, 
entrepreneurial firms needed to demonstrate how their products were fundamentally 
different from that of competitors. 
Taken together, these streams of literature are extremely useful in illuminating the 
components and benefits of scale and differentiation. However, research neglects to explain 
how firms transition towards scale and differentiation given their original opposite course of 
direction focused on customer accommodation and building legitimacy. In other words, 
which activities should firms employ to seed adoption, in leu of prior actions? For example, 
if not responding to all customers, how did Responsys know which customers to 
accommodate and under what circumstances?  In many industries, such as healthcare 
(Dougherty & Dunne, 2011; Mintzberg, 2018; Edomondson, Bohmer & Pisano, 2001) and 
clean tech (Kirtley & O’Mahony, 2019) customer work environments are not standardized. 
Thus, to gain adoption, entrepreneurs must adapt their innovations to integrate with the 
reality of their customers’ work environments or forgo making a sale. Integration often 
works against efforts to scale as it requires flexibility to revise innovations for the situated 
context in which they are deployed (Suchman, 1987, Burt, 2004). Yet, little research 
examines how entrepreneurs balance their divergent needs for flexibility and scale as they 
attempt to seed adoption for their innovations. 
Further, while research explains the importance of progressively framing an 
innovation as distinct from competitors, it is difficult to pinpoint how entrepreneurial firm 
make this transition. As noted by recent literature, “all new ventures that seek to grow into 
substantive enterprises will need to appeal to different audiences—with different legitimacy 





audiences are often the most likely to appreciate innovations which are novel and 
differentiated from prior products compared with late adopters (Rogers, 1983; Moore, 1995). 
With this in mind, striving for progressive differentiation might actually hamper 
organizational adoption as entrepreneurs attempt to reach broader audiences with different, 
less adventurous tastes (Norman, 2013). Further, within customer organizations, the 
adoption decision may be dispersed among multiple parties with varying preferences and 
familiarity with an innovation (e.g., Fiol, 1994; Zhao et al., 2017), complicating the degree to 
which entrepreneurs position innovations as familiar or distinct. While scholars recognize 
the importance of increasing the relevancy of an innovation over time, little research 
examines how firms progressively gain adoption for their innovations. Thus, what is needed 
is research examining the process by which entrepreneurial firms adjudicate desires for scale 
and differentiation with a need to foster continued organization adoption.  
Data Analysis 
I started analysis by open coding my field notes and interviews. It quickly became 
clear that the adoption process did not always begin after an innovation was developed, but 
in some cases started as entrepreneurs engaged with customers to understand their unmet 
needs. I noticed that entrepreneurs were modified their innovations to address unmet 
customer needs, and gaps in the market by developing new use cases. This prompted me to 
better understand the relationship between the development of new use cases and adoption. 
Thus, I temporally ordered and then coded all of my field data (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) 
paying special attention to if and how entrepreneurs identified and developed new use cases. 





plausible opportunities which might never be adopted, I only traced use-cases at “risk for 
adoption.” A use-case was “at risk for adoption” when entrepreneurial firms actually 
committed resources in the form of capital or labor to development. For example, when 
BREATH, a software and hardware company that helps patients manage asthma, dedicated 
two developers to create a new use-case for patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (COPD), I considered this use-case at risk for adoption. Overall, I identified 58 new 
use cases. Most firms pursued adoption for a single use case, whereas four firms attempted 
to gain adoption for two use cases.  
 Analyzing adoption activities. Next, I coded my field data to identify activities 
entrepreneurial firms deployed to gain adoption for new use cases. Activities depict the work 
practices an organization enacts to accomplish a set of tasks or routines (Perlow, 1999) and 
were critical to analyze as activities are the building blocks of strategic processes (Pentland, 
2003; Porter, 1991). Through cross comparison between extant theory and emergent codes 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967), I identified four key activities germane to gaining organizational 
adoption: (1) discovery, (2) decomposing solutions, (3) allocating resources and (4) 
introducing new use cases. When firms engaged in discovery, they identified new 
opportunities to expand the relevancy of their innovations. For example, when DOSING 
was prompted by insurance executives to expand their scope of offerings and pursue a new 
use-case, I coded this as discovery. Decomposing solutions involved assessing how to 
repurpose aspects of an existing innovation to develop a new use case. I coded BREATH as 
decomposing solutions when they evaluated how to repurpose their user interface aimed at 
helping children manage asthma for a new use case regarding COPD. When entrepreneurial 





a new use case. For instance, when the CEO of DOSING dedicated Henry, a team member, 
to develop a new use case, I code this activity as allocating resources. Lastly, introducing a 
new use case involved explaining how a use-case differed from competitive alternatives and 
describing how an adopting organization might use a new use-case. I coded BREATH as 
introducing a new use case when they met with a customer and pitched their innovation as a 
substitute for the COPD educational program Large hospital had in place.  
Exploring variance in the adoption process. My data revealed that how 
entrepreneurs engaged in adoption activities varied, but in limited ways. For example, when 
firms discovered new use cases, they either did so while engaging with customers or while 
conducting internal performance reviews. Two unique patterns emerged from the data: a 
customer centric process which focused on designing use cases to fulfill unmet customer 
needs; and a market centric process which focused on generating use cases to satisfy gaps in 
the market. While I did not expect to observe such patterns at the onset of my study, they 
were familiar to those offered by extant literature. The customer centric process fit with 
theories advocating that firms engage deeply with customers to design novel innovations 
(von Hippel, 1986; Norman, 2013). In contrast, the market centric pattern closely aligned 
with theories of disruptive innovation. Following Christensen, 1997, these entrepreneurs 
avoided engaging with customers to discover new use cases. Instead, they identified new use 
cases by examining ways to compete and dominate the broader market. Observing similar 
patterns to those found in prior research focused my subsequent efforts on understanding 
the relationship between these two divergent processes and adoption of a firm’s use case. 
Analyzing Use Case Adoption. I analyzed use case adoption in two ways. I first 





innovation over the course of my study. To determine if an entrepreneurial firm gained 
organizational adoption of a new use-case, I assessed whether they were able to contract for 
a paid live pilot during their time at Cure and for four months after the program concluded. 
In general pilots are understood as tests, to determine if a new innovation can be deployed 
and more fully adopted by a customer organization. However, according to my informants, 
in healthcare, when a customer agreed to a paid pilot, there was a high likelihood of 
ultimately deploying that innovation into an adopting organization’s operating environment. 
Both customers and entrepreneurs shared that pilots resulted in full deployment of an 
innovation in almost 80 percent of cases, to their knowledge (contingent on an innovation 
meeting other regulatory obligations if required). As such, paid pilots provided a valid proxy 
for adoption. Firms that gained adoption of a new use-case were able to expand their market 
scope as the new use-case either served a new function or customer need that widened the 
breadth and thus the market relevance of their innovation. 
 Second, because the processes I observed were similar to those described in the 
literature, either customer-centric or market centric (Christensen, 1997), I also assessed 
whether firms were able to design use cases that could satisfy unmet customer needs. I did 
this by validating with both customers and other experts, such as investors and mentors at 
the accelerator program that entrepreneurs’ use cases were novel and could solve real 
problems facing customers. I consulted with other experts as following Christensen & 
Bower, (1996), I was concerned that customers would fail to appreciate use cases that 
promised to fulfill latent needs.  
I then compared all of the process differences identified through coding and built a 





model that emerged elucidated both the importance of use cases as a mechanism for 
entrepreneurial growth and how a customer centric process fosters organizational adoption.  
EXPANDING SCOPE TO ACHIEVE ADOPTION  
Before explaining how entrepreneurial firms gained adoption for new use cases, it is 
helpful to understand why they endeavored to create new use cases to begin with, especially 
after developing innovations that were gaining traction with customers and investors. Extant 
research suggests that upon gaining market traction, entrepreneurs should scale their 
ventures by improving replicability and growing revenue without increasing costs (Desantola 
& Gulati, 2017; Tidar & Eisenhardt, 2020). However, my data revealed that all 54 
entrepreneurial firms at Cure expended resources in the form of capital and time to develop 
new extensions for their innovations. Firms at Cure titled such extensions, new use-cases. 
When queried as to why entrepreneurial firms pursued new use cases, my informants relayed 
that new use cases provided a way, even if unconventional, to address long customer sales 
cycles.  
According to my informants, the average duration of a customer sales cycle was 
seven months and could last as long as ten. “A long time for us as we have only been in 
existence for three years,” shared Fred, the founder of NOSHOW, an appointment 
scheduling application. Fred relayed:  
Getting a customer to adopt takes so long. You have to talk to so many 
people, the business heads, IT, doctors, nurses. It’s just so tedious to deal 
with each group as your job really becomes about building communal 
interest in your product where it doesn’t always exist. You really need more 
than one way to make money with these people, in case the first way is a 
flop. 





engaged with multiple people within customer organizations to gain adoption. As such, 
entrepreneurial firms at Cure only entertained three to five new customers at a time: “We 
don’t have resources to do more,” shared Fred. Thus, it behooved entrepreneurs to have 
more than one way to gain revenue from any one given customer. Fred expressed, “You 
want to either bring as much to the table as possible or be willing to adapt on the fly. You 
want a portfolio.”  
At the same time, entrepreneurial firms did not want to expend precious resources 
on entirely new innovations. According to Kate, the CEO of NUTRITION, a digital 
wellness application, pursuing a new use case entailed “developing something new by using 
existing pieces of your innovation. So that means reusing all the fundamental pieces of your 
innovation such as your data model and tech stack for something new.” Rather than start 
from scratch, when entrepreneurs developed new use-cases, they minimally alter their 
underlying innovations to make that innovation relevant for a new audience or purpose. By 
reusing fundamental aspects of their old innovation, entrepreneurs tried to grow the scope 
of their venture without incurring substantial costs. As expressed by Jamie, the CIO of 
NOSHOW, the development of new use cases “minimized the investment required to fund 
new sources of revenue. They enable balancing goals for scale with a need to make our 
innovations more tractable.”  
 GAINING ADOPTION FOR NEW USES CASES  
 I traced the activities firms deployed to gain adoption for new use cases. I identified 
two ways that adoption materialized through a customer centric or market centric process. 
Curiously, while both processes enabled entrepreneurial firms to identify new use-cases 





adoption for those new use-cases over the course of my study. This suggests that developing 
an innovation that satisfied unmet customer needs was insufficient to foster organizational 
adoption. Only entrepreneurial firms that learned how to pace the introduction of new use 
cases gained adoption.  
Customer-centric process  
Of the 54 entrepreneurial firms I studied, 21 employed a customer centric process. 
By a customer centric process, I mean that firms directly collaborated with customers to 
develop new use cases. This collaboration helped entrepreneurial firms formulate use cases 
which satisfied unmet customer needs, and learn how to strategically pace the introduction 
of use cases to accommodate the unique work environments of adopting organizations. 
Table 8 provides definitions and representative data explaining the how firms deploying a 
customer centric process gained organizational adoption for new use cases. I relay the in-
depth experiences of three exemplar firms, POSTINCIDENT, RECOVERY and TELA, to 
explicate the customer centric process in more detail.  
 Discovery. For entrepreneurial firms leveraging a customer centric process, use case 
discovery occurred while meeting with executives in customer organizations to pitch existing 
innovations. In these meetings, rather than offer an inelastic set of products or services, 
entrepreneurial firms remained flexible to augment an existing innovation if it helped open 
the door for a sale. For example, entrepreneurial firms purposefully avoided “pushing too 
hard on how their innovation could be used by a customer,” as explained by Tim, the CEO 
of POSTINCIDENT, a digital platform that helped provide post-operative care for patients 
receiving stents. Since meetings with executives were hard to come by, “and a critical part of 





product wasn’t an exact fit."  
For example, POSTINCIDENT secured a meeting with a chief of medicine at Large 
hospital. The chief was interested in POSTINCIDENT’s existing innovation but wondered 
if the hospital could focus on a different issue, general cardiological rehab. Tim relayed, “She 
[the chief] wanted to know if we could support other illnesses that benefit from rehab at 
home. Her team has a fairly advanced routine for providing post-operative support for 
patients receiving stents, but ongoing rehabilitation is a major pain-point.” This insight 
triggered POSTINCIDENT to consider a new use-case which would expand their scope 
from post-operative support into a larger space, cardiological rehabilitation.   
 While executives often shared interesting ideas, entrepreneurs were skeptical as to 
whether these ideas would translate into sound extensions of their innovations. 
Entrepreneurs’ skepticism was driven first by an acknowledgement that they did not always 
know much about the areas their customers pushed them towards. As Tim shared, “We 
didn’t know much about the broader topic of cardio rehab. We were dependent on what the 
chief was saying.” Second, entrepreneurs were concerned that executives did not understand 
how an innovation would be received by members of their organizations. As Tim noted, 
“People don’t always tell their boss that a pet project sucks.” POSTINCIDENT was 
intrigued by the issue raised by the chief but recognized the criticality of robustly 
understanding the problem before pursuing the idea any further. Tim expressed, “The idea 
was intriguing, expanding into rehab. We needed to do our due diligence. We couldn’t waste 
time building something custom for some chief of medicine that wouldn’t actually be used 
or more importantly, wouldn’t lead to a sale.” As such, firms pursuing a customer centric 





Decomposing solutions. Before committing to build a new use case, 
entrepreneurial firms convened internally and decomposed solutions by assessing what of 
their existing innovation could be repurposed for a new use case. Lynn explained that first, 
“We all sit down and evaluate what needs to be reused. The idea is to quickly cheaply tweak, 
not build something crazy.” Lynn described a process of analyzing a check list detailing both 
the fundamental and fungible aspects of their underlying innovation. Firms assessed the 
reusability of fundamental aspects of the innovation such as the technology stack, data 
model and scientific research underpinning an innovation, if relevant. Reuse of fundamental 
aspects was viewed as a mandate to both reduce time to produce a new use case and 
improve scalability. As Lynn relayed, “If the new use case requires chopping things that are 
fundamental, we nix it. It will just take too long. Plus, this is what gets us to a more scalable 
innovation as we are getting new use out of [fundamental aspects] without changing them”.  
Next, entrepreneurs projected a working set of requirements for their new use cases 
and assessed which fungible aspects of their existing innovation, such as the user interface or 
site content, required adaptation. Even though entrepreneurial firms had yet to fully vet 
executives’ visions for new use cases, they formulated working requirements based on their 
ideas. Executives often shared the “most technologically aggressive and robust view of 
organizational unmet needs,” as shared by Tim. Thus, decomposing solutions with 
executives’ articulations in mind ensured entrepreneurial firms developed a new use-case that 
could meet the maximum requirements of the organization, even if ultimately, they build a 
less robust solution. Formulating requirements to the needs set forth by executives also 
triggered entrepreneurial firms to assume that a use case would require a notable number of 





necessary to vet executives’ views.  
Allocating resources. When entrepreneurial firms allocated resources, they 
determined how to reconfigure their internal team to free capacity for the development of a 
new use case. Despite having on average five employees, firms employing a customer centric 
approach dedicated team members to engage in this work, rather than allocate team 
members to multiple contemporaneous projects. Dedicating a team member provided 
uninterrupted time to vet executives’ ideas and build the relationships necessary to unlock 
often well-guarded information about customer work environments.  
For example, Myra the head of HR at Generic insurance company, was interested in 
using RECOVERY’s at-home drug testing capability developed for people in addiction 
recovery. During my interview with Myra, she expressed two issues with which she hoped 
RECOVERY could help: (1) cost reduction in recruiting prospective employees: drug testing 
through outside laboratories was expensive; and (2) more efficiently analyzing failed 
candidate searches, which due to drug testing, were burdensome as drug usage policies 
within her organization frequently updated. Myra relayed, “We can’t just ding people who 
have a positive drug test. These days all the intangibles come into play.” The changed policy 
introduced a new work burden on the HR team, but from Myra’s perspective, “This analysis 
could be handled by an algorithm. It would make for less work and it would be easier for us 
to justify our analysis.”  
Matt, the founder of RECOVERY, understood Myra’s issues but was dubious about 
whether other members of the HR department would appreciate a use case that could 
eliminate their need to conduct analysis on failed candidate searches. Matt explained that 





her to spend time just scoping [the use case] out with people within [Generic].” Jane 
regularly met with 10 people with diversified roles and responsibilities within and outside the 
HR department. She observed them at work and joined their meetings. Jane explained that if 
she wanted to see the way HR conducted analysis, to determine if and how to automate the 
failed search process, she would need to integrate herself within HR. Jane shared, “I needed 
time to iterate and be available whenever a member of Generic was free to talk. I couldn’t 
answer the call of other customer obligations or tasks that could interfere.” Thus, dedicating 
resources gave firms uninterrupted time to validate executive’s ideas of unmet needs and 
determine how to solve for those needs.  
Second, dedicating resources enabled firms to build deep relationships within 
adopting organizations. From these relationships, entrepreneurial firms developed an 
understanding of the work environments of adopting organizations and the obstacles 
members of an organization could erect when that environment was challenged by the 
introduction new innovations. Matt relayed how Jane gained such insight, “Because the HR 
folks and other business people got to know Jane, they just spilled their guts to her. We 
thought dedicating someone would help us focus, but it also had a surprising effect. We 
gained all this info about people’s concerns.”  Further, because Jane’s interactions spanned 
levels and occupational groups, she gained a system view of the working environment at 
Generic, and how an innovation might disrupt that environment by shifting work roles and 
jurisdictional tasks.  
In fact, Jane shared with me that one customer member explained how a different 





Just ram the thing in. They had all these features that appealed to top 
executives, as it could automate aspects of the claims process and make the 
whole thing more efficient. But when the middle managers and underwriters 
and other groups got it, they were really concerned. They thought it might 
threaten their job. My contact at Generic was like – oh yeah, this is another 
way management is trying to make our jobs better and reduce workload, but 
really fire people. So, my contact totally pooh, poohed the thing, and said it 
wouldn’t work.  They didn’t adopt it. 
 
My field notes confirmed that the firm in question, did indeed develop a new use case that 
executives at Generic found appealing and did solve for a clear issue in the organization. But 
middle managers across roles and occupational groups found the use case threatening, as it 
could automate some of their collective work. They rallied together and advocated 
successfully for Generic to forgo adopting the firm’s use case. The entrepreneurial firm had 
failed to build deep relationships with members of Generic and thus did not gain 
information about how to introduce their use case in a way that appealed to the broader 
organization. 
Introducing use cases. When entrepreneurial firms introduced new use cases, they 
determined how to position a use case in comparison to market and organizational 
substitutes and established the speed at which to deploy a new use case. Firms employing a 
customer centric process leveraged the information they gained about the work 
environments of adopting organizations to strategically pace the introduction of new use 
cases. Strategic pacing unfolded in two ways. First, in the short-run, firms introduced only a 
subset of the features embedded within their new use case. Second, entrepreneurial firms 
downplayed how their use cases might automate work in adopting organizations by 
introducing their use cases as tools rather than substitutes for labor or competitive products. 





to market and organizational alternatives and introducing additional features that supported 
such positioning. For example, RECOVERY developed the search analysis tool as part of 
their use case for drug testing of prospective employees. However, based on the information 
they gained collaborating with Generic, they did not immediately introduce the function. As 
Jane explained, “I figured out we could eventually launch [the analysis feature], because Myra 
really wanted it. But not in the beginning, because the team would fight it and we would not 
get anything adopted. We first had to introduce the drug testing-at-home capability, and then 
later we could roll out the other piece.”  
Second, drawing from another example, TELA introduced their new use cases as a 
tool rather than a substitute for labor to gain organizational adoption with Local hospital. 
TELA, a telehealth platform, developed a new use case which could diagnose smart phone 
images of skin lesions as cancerous or benign. Kim, the CEO of TELA, relayed that in the 
short-run she would “position this new use-case as a tool for nurses” to support work nurses 
undertook to triage patients’ symptoms and prioritize their visits with dermatologists. Later 
on, once the use case was deployed at Local, TELA would demonstrate how the tool could 
substitute for the work nurses conducted triaging patients. Kim explained, “We probably will 
try to get the administrators to use [the diagnostic tool]” to automate the full triage to 
scheduling process.” This would enable TELA to gain organization adoption for the use 
case in the short-run and still offer a disruptive capability over time. As such, a customer 
centric process enabled entrepreneurial firms to build use cases that appeased diverse 






Market-centered process  
Approximately two-thirds of the firms I studied utilized a market centric process to 
gain organizational adoption for new use cases. A market centric process entailed 
formulating disruptive new use cases that fulfilled market gaps and differed from 
competitive alternatives. Firms leveraging a market centric process developed use cases that 
satisfied the unmet needs of adopting organizations but struggled to gain organizational 
adoption for new use cases. Table 9 details how firms pursuing a market centric process 
discovered new use cases, decomposed their existing solutions, allocated resources and 
introduced their innovations to adopting organizations. I explain how three firms, 
NUTRITION, CARE AND ERULES, pursued a market centric process in detail.  
Discovery. In contrast to discovering new use cases collaboratively with customers, 
entrepreneurial firms employing a market centric process discovered new use cases when 
conducting internal reviews aimed at digging into the latest actions of competitors. For 
example, NUTRITION, a wellness application, implemented internal reviews to analyze 
how their innovation fared in the market compared with key competitors. During one such 
review session, Cathy, the head of product, raised that the market for wellness applications 
was saturated, but few competitors were addressing pregnancy wellness as a niche. This 
triggered NUTRITION to consider a new use-case that would broaden their scope from 
providing general diet and nutritional coaching to also offering more specialized coaching.  
Over the course of my study, all 54 entrepreneurial firms had the opportunity to 
work collaboratively with customers to discover new use cases, yet firms pursuing a market 
centric process refrained from doing so. My data reveals two reasons why entrepreneurs 





employing a market centric process had previously invested time engaging with customers 
to unearth unmet needs and develop their underlying innovation. Entrepreneurs believed 
this upfront investment in understanding the customer was robust and transferable and 
thus, could inform development of a new use case. For example, Kate, the CEO of 
NUTRITION, shared how NUTRITION had made “a big investment in understanding 
what customers needed and valued.” They would not need “to circle backwards and 
through the process again and again.” Second, in line with research on impression 
management (Zott & Huy, 2007), entrepreneurs pursuing a market centric process 
endeavored to appear well prepared when meeting with customers. As Kate expressed, 
“One way to show you understand your customer, is to have options ready on the table, 
rather than fumble to adapt in the moment. If you don’t know the issues when you are 
meeting with execs to sell your product, you look unprofessional.” While firms leveraging a 
customer-centric process discovered new use cases as part of an open collaboration with 
customers, firms pursuing a market centric process avoided such interactions, viewing them 
as inefficient and as Kate shared, “unprofessional.” Instead, they anchored their new use 
cases to gaps they uncovered in the market when comparing their own innovations to that 
of competitors and substitutes. 
Decomposing solutions. All of the firms I studied considered how to reuse their 
existing innovation before developing a new use case. However, since a market centric 
process involved deriving use cases by scanning competitors’ activities, entrepreneurial 
firms maintained that preview while decomposing solutions. Thus, firms leveraging a 
market centric process analyzed competitors’ products and services rather than customers’ 






We downloaded [competitor’s] products to understand how they were 
addressing, pregnancy wellness. We saw that they were focused on it 
generally, but did not really have information for women with underlying 
health issues, like high blood pressure or diabetes. We really understand 
those issues from our general work in wellness and nutrition. Thus, we could 
offer health plans a more comprehensive offering, maybe even a cheaper 
option than having these women meet more frequently with doctors or nurse 
practitioners.  
 
In contrast to firms pursuing a customer centric process that believed they knew little about 
the space their new use case could address, entrepreneurial firms deploying a market centric 
process leveraged their existing expertise to address gaps in the market. For example, 
NUTRITION believed their general expertise on diabetes would help them develop a new 
use case that could “surpass and disrupt what [competitors] are doing in pregnancy” as 
John shared.  
According to a number of my informants, this approach to decomposition also 
provided “A bird’s eye view of what many customers wanted at the market level, not just a 
single customer,” as John explained This enabled firms to move away from myopically 
focusing on the unique circumstances of a single customer. John relayed, “If you do listen 
to customers, you have to vet what they say against other customers to ensure you don’t 
develop anything too custom that no one else will buy. That all takes so much time.” 
Decomposing with a customer’s viewpoint in mind required either significant time to vet or 
could diminish scalability. Both limited the benefits of developing a new use case, which in 
the words of Kate from NUTRITION, “was a quick, cheap, scalable way to increase 
revenue.” In this way, entrepreneurial firms pursuing a market centric process leveraged 





cases that could fulfill gaps in the market, not just the needs of single customer.  
Allocating resources.  Extant research suggests that because entrepreneurs are 
unfettered by asset specific investments (Penrose, 1959) and are effective at bricolage 
(Baker & Nelson, 2005), they can engage in multiple tasks at once. Consistent with this 
suggestion, entrepreneurs employing a market-centric process allocated team members to 
both develop new use cases and attend to existing business concerns at the same time. these 
firms assumed that new use case would take minimal resources to build as they planned to 
rely on their existing expertise.  
For example, CARE, a company that coordinates patient care across different 
hospital departments, realized they could develop a new use-case to reduce test duplication 
in clinical settings. Although Jim was already supporting technical maintenance of CARE’s 
existing innovation, the CTO believed he could split his time, as Jim had preexisting 
expertise regarding development of the new use case. The CTO of CARE shared, “Jim 
wrote our reconciliation scripts that compare across different clinical areas before. He can 
just apply those aspects of our existing innovation to this new use-case”.  The CTO 
explained that, “Jim can be like 70 on the new dev and like 30 on old. That way when 
things come up on our current application, he can support. That application should be 
pretty plug and play at this point.” Jim’s expertise along with the “plug and play” status of 
their initial innovation gave the CTO of CARE comfort and latitude to allocate Jim’s time 
to both new and old parts of the business.  
 Despite assumptions that ongoing business concerns would not require much 
attention, troubleshooting issues on an initial innovation took time. For example, instead of 





troubleshooting CARE’s existing innovation. This detracted from Jim’s focus as he shared, 
“I didn’t have any time to do deep customer work and observe how doctors and nurses 
would use the new use case in practice.” Jim was concerned that he made a lot of 
assumptions regarding doctors’ trust in tests conducted in different clinical environments or 
departments. He shared, “I just assumed they would use previous tests if they had access to 
results. But what if the issue is, they don’t trust the tests and think it is their job to order 
tests; not that they are unaware of prior tests. That is a different problem.” Yet, Jim did not 
have the time to fact find and uncover the “real problems behind test duplication” as he 
shared.  
 Further, these firms did not have time to forge deep relationships with customers. 
Thus, they did not gain information about how a use case might be received by diverse 
members within an adopting organization. Jim explained how he had conducted some 
testing with users. These users expressed how the functionality embedded within CARE’s 
new use case was appealing. However, the users did not explain how the use case would be 
received in their organization.  
We did do some testing, after we built the use case. I set up some testing 
interviews. I remember this one doc was like ya, [the use case] is brilliant. I 
realized later, she thought it was a good idea in principle, but would never 
use it. There is too much political and legal pressure to order your own tests. 
She didn’t share how doctors would advocate against it, and that doctors had 
quite a bit of power in her organization.  
 
As such, firms leveraging a market centric process developed use cases that satisfied market 
gaps, but did not gain an understanding of how the adoption decision might unfold within 
customer organizations. Unlike firms pursuing a customer centric process, they did not gain 





to navigate those dynamics.   
 Introducing new use cases. Extant literature advocates that upon establishing 
market legitimacy, entrepreneurial firms should seek to differentiate themselves from 
competitors and market alternatives (Navis and Glynn, 2010). Consistent with this 
suggestion and in contrast to firms pursuing a customer centric process, firms leveraging a 
market centric process presented themselves as alternatives to competitors and 
organizational substitutes. In efforts to differentiate from market alternatives, these firms 
also comprehensively rolled out all of the functionality embedded within their use cases 
rather than hold back disruptive elements.  
 For example, E-RULES, which coordinated care for patients with diabetes, designed 
a use case that could automatically modify care management plans for patients with 
depression. Ned, the CEO of E-RULES, explained how their prior knowledge and 
investigation of market alternatives motivated their approach: “We based our use case on 
what we knew from developing our diabetes offering and the new stuff we learned about 
competitors. This enabled us to create something that surpassed competitors, but also gave 
us the awareness that opportunity wasn’t going to last forever. The market for mental health 
is moving fast.”  A market centric processes helped firms gain a sense of the speed at which 
competitors were moving and what might be required to respond. Another factor 
contributing to why firms introduced their use cases as distinct from substitutes was a view 
that customers were uninclined to adopt innovations too similar to processes or technology 
deployed within their organizations. Ned shared, “Why would [Big hospital] adopt it if it is 
basically the same thing as what they do. We were like, we have to show them how what we 





 Despite generating a use case that could surpass competitor offerings and differed 
from organizational substitutes, E-RULES received significant pushback on its new use-case 
when attempting to gain organizational adoption. E-RULES’s use case automated aspects of 
care management which represented an immediate threat to nurses, critical influencers to a 
potential purchasing decision. Heads of nursing when asked about adopting E-RULES’s use 
case: “You can’t just automate [updating and distributing care plans]. It’s what we do. We are 
the layer between the patient and the doctor. It is a critical touchpoint.” Ned shared his 
insight as to why E-RULE could not gain commitment: 
E-RULES can’t work by itself. Well it can technically, but we won’t get buy 
in. We missed this in our development process. The nurses want us to 
acknowledge that we're relying on them to take information, and then make 
the appropriate changes to the care plan. And so, I hear that and it's like, 
okay, there's some art here and it just needs to be acknowledged as much as 
we want to engineer it. 
 
Firms utilizing a market centric process failed to understand how their use cases would be 
received by critical decision-makers and gatekeepers within adopting organizations. They 
never gained a contextual understanding of customers’ work environments and thus did not 
know to strategically pace the introduction of new use cases.  
VARIATION IN THE USE-CASE ADOPTION PROCESS  
 All 54 firms I studied identify ways to achieve scale while growing their market scope 
by reusing their existing innovation to develop new use cases. Further all firms developed 
use cases which could satisfied unmet customer needs, in a scalable way. Yet, firms 
leveraging a market centric process struggled to gain adoption for their use cases. Table 10 
maps use case adoption rates by process. The table shows that generally, firms deploying a 





utilizing a market centric process, at least during the course of my study, did not.  
 There are several factors I evaluated to determine why some entrepreneurial firms 
gained adoption for their new use-cases while others were not. Literature would suggest that 
firms which acquired greater levels of funding, and revenue at the beginning of my study 
may be of a higher quality (e.g., Guzman and Stern, 2015; Kerr, Nanda & Rhodes-Kropf, 
2014) and as a result would be more likely to gain adoption for new use cases. I did not find 
this to be the case, as some firms that had generated greater than average levels of revenue 
or funding leveraged a customer centric process, and some a market centric process. 
Founder gender, sub-sector alignment or founder experience also did not indicate whether 
an entrepreneurial firm was more or less likely to gain adoption for a new use-case. I also 
examined whether firms attempted to sell new use-cases to existing customers or new 
customer, and this too did not explain the results. 
One factor that would seem critical to the adoption of new use cases is to what 
degree a new use case departed from an initial innovation. Use cases that greatly differed 
from an underlying innovation might have taken longer to build or required more market 
fact finding to develop than use cases that were more similar to an underlying innovation. 
This was more challenging to unpack, as it is difficult to know precisely how many changes 
firms made to their underlying innovation to deliver a new use case. However, very few 
firms developed use cases which expanded into new sub-sectors or new markets altogether. 
For instance, if a firm’s original innovation improved care management, generally a new use 
case also addressed the care management sub-sector. Another potential concern was that to 
ensure adoption, firms employing a customer centric process developed use cases tightly fit 





organizations. However, this was not the case. Firms pursuing a customer centric process 
often gained adoption for new use cases from organizations other than the one they 
collaborated with during discovery, at least over the course of my study.  
If these factors did not explain how firms achieved organizational adoption, what 
might account for the variance I observed? The data revealed that developing a use case that 
satisfied unmet customer needs was insufficient to fostering adoption. Instead, a critical 
component to gaining organization adoption was learning how to strategically pace the 
introduction of a new use case – insight gained by using a customer centric process. Figure 5 
depicts a model for influencing use case adoption. The model relays how firms using a 
customer centric process, uncovered the often-obscure dynamics of customer work 
environments such as who had influence, and how influence was wielded, which informed 
the use of strategic pacing. 
I derived this model by comparing the actions taken by firms pursuing a customer 
centric process with the actions both employed and avoided by firms utilizing a market 
centric process. This comparison helped elucidate the critical antecedents, components and 
outcomes of use case adoption.   
 As the right side of the model relays, use case adoption was predicated on two 
critical antecedents. First, entrepreneurial firms that ultimately gained adoption for their use 
cases, questioned the extensibility of their prior knowledge, and restrained the use of this 
knowledge when developing a new use case. Although these firms had conducted deep due 
diligence with customers originally, to launch their underlying innovations, they did not 
presume that the insights gained from such efforts extended to new development. This 





assess how they could address those ideas using their existing innovation as a starting point. 
This stands in stark contrast to firms leveraging a market centric process, as these firms 
viewed their prior customer due diligence as highly relevant for new development efforts. 
Indeed, prior knowledge and expertise helped firms identify unmet customer needs, but they 
did not gain adoption for these use cases.  
A second antecedent was skepticism of executives’ views on opportunities for new 
use cases, as executives did not always understand how a new innovation would be received 
within their own business units or departments. Skepticism led firms to understand that it 
would take time and effort to vet executives’ ideas, prompting firms to dedicated team 
members, rather than splitting a team member’s attention across multiple projects, to engage 
deeply within customer organizations. Deep customer engagement involved building 
relationships with diverse members of a customer organization -- beyond just executives -- 
spanning roles, levels and professions. Through such engagement, entrepreneurs learned that 
executives were critical sources of information regarding an innovation’s future potential, 
but middle managers, line workers and professionals had stronger grasps on what an 
organization would currently adopt. Moreover, non-executives, middle managers and 
professionals often directly influenced adoption decisions (e.g., Dutton and Ashford, 1993) 
and their views on the usefulness of an innovation could vary greatly from that of executives. 
Interweaving the perspectives of various members within a customer organization enabled 
entrepreneurs to robustly design use cases (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001), that could evolve 
with customers’ work environments and identify how to hold back, in the short-run, aspects 
of their use cases that were more controversial.   





dedicating resources enabled firms to design robust use cases and gain a contextual 
understanding of customer’s work environments. Combined these inputs informed how 
firms strategically paced the introduction of new use-cases. Strategic pacing comprised of 
holding back disruptive aspects of a use case that members of an adopting organization 
might find threatening. Disruptive aspects of a use case entailed functionality that could 
displace work or role relations within an adopting organization. Holding back disruptive 
aspects of a use case did not mean firms neglected to develop such functionality. On the 
contrary, firms pursuing both customer and market centric processes, developed use cases 
with the potential to disrupt customer work environments, as such features were often what 
differentiated a use case from competitors’ offerings. However, strategic pacing involved 
restraint; withholding disruptive elements of a use case to foster adoption but planning to 
release such elements in the future. In a similar vein, strategic pacing also involved 
positioning a use case in the near term as a complement to systems and processes customers 
had in place. When innovations complement systems in place, they are more easily integrated 
as adopting organizations need not adapt ancillary systems or processes to accommodate the 
new innovation (Rogers, 1983).  
 The left side of the model depicts outcomes. The entrepreneurial firms that leveraged 
a customer centric process gained adoption for their new use cases. But perhaps more 
critically, these firms grew the relevance of their innovations, in a scalable way. When firms 
realize their investment in new use cases, they built scale and grew market scope. Firms built 
scale because they reused much of their existing innovations as a foundation for new use 
cases. New use cases also extended the relevance of innovations with new and existing 





DIGITAL DIAGNOSIS: GAINING ADOPTION FOR INNOVATIONS THAT 
DISPLACE ORGANIZATIONAL WORK PRACTICES  
 
Digital innovations, often developed by innovative entrepreneurs, hold the promise 
of decreasing communication and transaction costs (Malone & Crowston, 1994), cultivating 
new sources of data (Zuboff, 1988) and increasing the speed at which organizations 
distribute and consume information (Greenstein, Lerner & Stern, 2013). Yet the way 
organizations implement these innovations can upend organizational structures and role 
relations (Barley, 1986; Barley, 1990; Dougherty & Dunne, 2011); routines and team 
dynamics (Orlikowski, 1993; Edmondson, Bohmer & Pisano, 2001; Leonardi & Barley, 
2010) and shift when, and how quickly, employees complete work tasks (Mazmanian, 
Orlikowski & Yates, 2013). The implementation of new digital innovations can also create 
instability in work practices when the value promised by the innovation is unrealized (Kohli 
& Kettingger, 2004). 
Work practices comprise of “what it is people do every day to get their work done” 
(Orlikowski, 2002:249), and include the activities (Perlow, 1999), routines and processes 
(Pentland, 2003; Orr, 1996), role relations (Barley, 1986; Leonardi & Barley, 2010) and 
representations (Suchman, 1995) organizational actors use “on the ground” to accomplish 
work. The displacement of work practices can create organizational efficiencies, improve 
work quality, and enable new types of value creation (Tambe et al., 2012), through the 
automation, elimination and replacement of tasks (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2018) However, 
work practice displacement can also spur new forms of employee surveillance and control 
(Sewell, 1998; Anteby & Chen, 2018; Kohli & Kettingger, 2004) create team conflict 





work (Braverman, 1998). Thus, organizations face a quandary when determining whether 
and how to adopt digital innovations into their work environments, as the benefits promised 
may create an equivalent number of challenges when implemented in practice. 
 Given this quandary, it is not surprising that scholars have examined adoption of 
novel innovations, such as digital innovations, from the perspective of organizations 
introducing a new innovation. When an organization adopts an innovation, it commits to 
purchase, use and deploy that innovation within its own work environment (Rogers, 1983). 
Organizational size (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981); knowledge resources (Dewar & Dutton; 
1986); managerial cognition (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000); experience implementing prior 
innovations (March, 1991); and experiences of proximate organizations implementing a 
novel innovation (Greve; 2011), all contribute to an organization’s decision to adopt new 
innovations. The radicalness of an innovation can moderate the predictive power of these 
conditions (Dewar & Dutton; 1986). Yet, often external actors such as entrepreneurs, 
generate disruptive innovations (Schumpeter, 1942; Kortum & Lerner, 2000). To source 
novel innovations, Hitt, Ireland, Sirmon and Trahms (2011:67) suggest that incumbent firms: 
“rarely have the resources needed to achieve this type of innovation internally, they 
frequently search external sources to locate them… frequently, new venture firms are more 
creative and thus can develop more novel innovations.” Despite recognizing that external 
actors are often harbingers of novel innovations with the potential to displace work 
practices, little work examines adoption from the other perspective, the entrepreneurial 
actor’s perspective – how do entrepreneurs creating innovations with the potential to displace work 
practices convince organizations to adopt their new innovations?  





innovations. First, in many industries, such as healthcare (Dougherty & Dunne, 2011; 
Mintzberg, 2018) and clean tech (Kirtley & O’Mahony, 2019) entrepreneurs must figure out 
how to integrate their disruptive innovations with the reality of their customers’ actual work 
environments. Rarely is integration a static, unidirectional and transactional process (Carlile 
& Rebentisch, 2003; Burt, 2004) as it involves revising and adapting innovations for the 
situated context in which they are deployed (Suchman, 1987). For example, it was only after 
the health technology company EPIC piloted their software with hospital systems, that they 
realized doctors were reluctant to use their technology. Doctors viewed EPIC as taking time 
away from critical diagnostic and treatment work and resented time spent charting and 
navigating cumbersome digital fields. As a result, EPIC adapted aspects of their innovation 
to meet doctor’s needs. As entrepreneurs deploy their innovations with consumers and 
different groups of users, they can surface unexpected limitations to the use of those 
innovations in new contexts and new opportunities for growth (Desanctis & Poole, 1994). 
Despite recent calls to understand how entrepreneurial firms dynamically reorient their 
strategies in response to market feedback (McDonald & Gao, 2019), less research considers 
how entrepreneurs continue to develop and revise their innovations as they attempt to gain 
adoption and integrate into adopting organizations’ work environments.   
Entrepreneurs not only make choices about the functionality underlying their 
innovations as they attempt to integrate into adopting organizations’ work environments, 
they also have agency in how they position their innovations for external stakeholders. The 
way entrepreneurs position their innovations to fit the preferences of early adopters versus 
main-stream customers (Moore, 1991), investors versus customers, may also be a critical 





innovations, they rarely are the first, unique or non-substitutable in the market (Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009; Navis & Glynn, 2010; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2019). Thus, adopting 
organizations not only have the choice of whether to adopt a novel innovation, but whose 
novel innovation to adopt. How an entrepreneur differentiates his innovation in comparison 
to market alternatives can also critically influence customer adoption. When entrepreneurs 
claim that their innovations are highly disruptive or differentiated compared with market 
alternatives, they are often rewarded by investors and market influencers (Zott & Huy, 
2007). However, striving for differentiation can hamper application and integration with 
adopting organizations that may be reluctant to adopt innovations that could displace their 
work practices (Norman, 2013). While extant scholarship recognizes that preferences among 
different stakeholder groups can vary (Kellogg, 2011), less research explores how 
entrepreneurs mediate these differences over time.  
This research contributes to scholarship on organizational theory, strategy and 
entrepreneurship. More specifically, in a departure from scholarship that theorizes about the 
process of adoption from the point of view of an adopting organization, it provides a 
grounded theory of the adoption process from the perspective of the innovator. This 
perspective aids in illuminating the potentially costly tradeoffs entrepreneurs make 
redeploying their resources and adjusting the scope of their innovations to expand the 
relevancy of their innovations in new contexts. Further this study helps explain how 
entrepreneurs balance the desire to disrupt competitors with the need to diffuse customer 
concerns regarding how a new innovation will displace work practices. To find the balance, 
some entrepreneurs purposefully slow the introduction of aspects of their innovations to 





innovate, improve quality and reduce redundant cost structures in the field of health.  
 
METHODS 
Through ethnographic interviews with the prospective customers of these 
entrepreneurial firms, I quickly realized that customers showed great interest in the new 
technologies underpinning many of the entrepreneurs’ innovations. These technologies 
purported to improve both the quality and efficiency of healthcare delivery. However, these 
same customers also feared that once adopted, such technologies might displace work tasks 
or routines within their organizations and shift organizational power structures in politically 
unpalatable ways. Entrepreneurs were well aware of this concern.  
To better understand the import and consequences of these concerns about work 
displacement, I employed inductive, qualitative methods to analyze the dyadic interactions of 
six entrepreneurial firms and three prospective customer organizations. All six 
entrepreneurial firms were utilizing machine learning technologies to automate aspects of 
medical diagnostics work. Since existing theory examining the relationship between the 
design of novel technologies and their implementation was underdeveloped (Leonardi & 
Barley, 2008), I leveraged an inductive qualitative research design to build grounded theory 
(Edmondson and McManus 2007). Moreover, because the nature of this study was 
somewhat controversial, querying topics such as job loss and deskilling, a qualitative research 
design offered me the space through observation and interviews to discern and probe upon 
informants’ true experiences, which could have been lost through surveying or other 
quantitative means (Becker, 1963). Analysis at the dyadic level was useful to understand how 





novel innovation, without giving primacy to either party (Podolny, 1994; Larson, 1992; 
Graebner, 2009).  
Sample Selection. All of the entrepreneurial firms in my study purported to use 
machine learning technologies as foundational to preforming medical diagnostic work. 
Machine learning is a “form of computational statistics, is based on algorithms that use data 
to generate predictions” (Jamieson & Goldfarb (2019:778). These predictions improve 
automatically as an algorithm encounters more data and eventually enable machines to 
preform work without or with minimal human intervention. New machine learning 
technologies are generally used to preform medical diagnostic work in one of three ways, by: 
(1) capturing or counting out known medical irregularities difficult to observe with the 
human eye; (2) identifying new irregularities not previously known to be indicators of an 
illness; (3) offering potential treatment plans for confirmed diagnoses. For example, 
MAMMO, a firm in my sample, leveraged machine learning in two of three ways. First 
MAMMO purported that compared with radiologists, their innovation could limit false 
positives by more accurately determining when mammograms contained no known 
malignancies. MAMMO, also utilized machine learning to identify novel indicators of 
cancerous tumors in patients whose mammograms were previously diagnosed as clinically 
negative. In both cases, MAMMO did not require any intervention from doctors to make 
these diagnoses.  
The use of machine learning for medical diagnostics was well suited for study as such 
use has been hotly and publicly debated, due in large part to concerns by scholars and 
practitioners about the role of machine learning in displacing work (Jamison & Goldfarb, 





Naumann, Schulam, Beam, Chen, Ranganath, 2019). Although the use of artificial 
intelligence to support differential diagnoses is not a novel concept, recent advances in 
machine learning have enabled algorithms to replace rather than merely support diagnostic 
work performed by doctors and nurses (Topel, 2019, Esteva et al., 2017). Since I was 
concerned about the extent to which informants might share their experiences about work 
and job loss openly, the highly visible and well documented nature of this debate enabled 
triangulation between concerns shared by informants, and those posed through public 
discourse (Jick, 1979).  
Sampling strategy. To understand how entrepreneurial firms shape the way new 
innovations are used by customer organizations a constructed a sample of 13 overlapping 
dyadic pairs. To develop dyadic pairings which enabled replication logic (e.g., Yin, 1994), I 
first constructed a sample from the 54 firms matriculating through the accelerator program 
during my time of study. Drawing samples from accelerators offered several benefits to 
improve internal validity and comparability across firms (Karp & O’Mahony, 2019). First, all 
firms participating in the accelerator were vetted by impartial, randomly assigned judges 
utilizing the same criteria (e.g., strength of value proposition, market differentiation, levels of 
funding or revenue generation). Second, unlike most accelerator programs that source early-
stage, pre-seed entrepreneurs (Cohen, 2013), this accelerator accepted mature entrepreneurial 
firms that had already developed viable products. These factors help to ensure that 
entrepreneurial firms in my sample were at a stage of maturity when issues of how to 
implement their product or service within customer work environments come to the fore. 
Of the 54 entrepreneurial firms that matriculated through the accelerator, I select the 





learning to preform medical diagnostic work. Although these entrepreneurial firms shared 
characteristics endemic to gaining entry into the accelerator program, they also had marked 
differences, as they varied in team experience, targeted medical specialty, and geographic 
proximity to investors or academic centers. Scholars postulate that prior team experience 
(Kor, 2003), sector focus (Agarwal & Gort, 2002) and propinquity to sources of capital or 
knowledge (Powell, Koput, Bowie & Smith-Doerr, 2005) can influence entrepreneurial firm 
performance. Thus, diversity in this sample offered the theoretical range needed to 
illuminate common aspects of the implementation process regardless of entrepreneurial firm 
experience, sector focus, or geography and highlight differences (Harris and Sutton, 1986; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2008).  
While these six firms engaged with many different customers over the 24 months of 
my study, they shared a combination of at least two of three prospective customers (Blue 
health system Red health system and Community health system). Two of the three customer 
organizations were large health systems with notable academic hospitals (Blue hospital and 
Red hospital). The remaining customer organization was a community health system. All 
three customer organizations stated in documents shared with me from the accelerator 
program an interested in adopting innovations developed by entrepreneurial firms. These 
attestations were not merely lip service as all three had also invested resources in establishing 
internal centers of innovation purposed with vetting possible partnerships with 
entrepreneurial firms. In total, from this set of entrepreneurial firms and customer 
organizations, I constructed a sample of 13 dyadic pairs. Designing a sample with 
overlapping dyads helped to isolate if and when variance in my findings was driven by 





innovation in the medical diagnostic space, or factors unique to an entrepreneurial firm. 
Table 11 provides an overview of each dyad, including details about each entrepreneurial 
firm such as funding, revenue, and medical specialty of focus.  
Data analysis. As a first step in my analysis, I compiled my field notes by dyadic 
pair and reviewed how each dyad interacted over time (Emerson et al., 1995; Locke, 2002). 
This review surfaced an important element to the implementation process, piloting. 
According to my informants, no innovation was implemented broadly within a customer 
organization without first being piloted in practice. Piloting consisted of testing the way an 
innovation might work within a customer’s organization for a limit duration time period by 
deploying it in one or two user groups. For example, when SKIN ran a 3-month trial of their 
innovation with Red health system, I coded this as a pilot. Pilots consisted of: (1) free trials 
when entrepreneurs deployed their innovation without compensation and bore some costs 
associated with implementing an innovation; (2) for pay when entrepreneurial firms were 
remunerated for a trial and did not bear associated costs; (3) for some exchange in value, 
such as when Blue health system offered to support the testing needed for Skin’s clinical trial 
in exchange for a free access to SKIN’s innovation. By tracing how pilots were agreed upon 
and then physically implemented, I began to develop grounded themes about the recursive 
way entrepreneurial firms’ and customer organizations shaped the design and role of novel 
innovations in displacing work practices. (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 
1990). With these working themes in hand, my analysis then followed a phased process. 
Phase 1: Mapping the piloting process. I engaged in open coding of all my data sources 





three stages: (1) decisioning; (2) integrating; and (3) deploying. During the decisioning stage 
entrepreneurial firms and customer decision makers discussed and agreed upon the scope of 
a prospective pilot. This included determining which specific aspects of an innovation would 
be tested, the type of users (e.g., doctors and nurses) that would trial the innovation, number 
of users, and the potential timing of a pilot. The integrating stage occurred as entrepreneurial 
firms and customers tried to make innovations interoperate with customers’ technical 
systems or workflow. For example, when MAMMO changed some of their system protocol 
when those protocol prompted an error in a Red hospital system, I coded this as occurring 
during the integrating stage. The deploying stage occurred when customers utilized an 
entrepreneurial firm’s innovation with selected groups.  
Phase 2: Categorizing issues. After understanding the stages of the piloting process, I 
coded for issues that arose as entrepreneurial firms and customers interacted to conduct 
pilots. Building on Dutton & Jackson (1987) issues consisted of positive rationale and 
concerns customers shared with entrepreneurial firms about piloting their innovation, that 
could derail a pilot. For example, when Community health system told SENSOR that they 
would need to alter their monitoring algorithm during the integration phase of a pilot, I 
coded it as an issue. A set of dominant issues surfaced within each stage of the piloting 
process. I grouped issues thematically based on comparing and contrasting my analysis with 
prior literature (Glaser & Straus, 1967; Charmaz, 2006). While the specific nature of each 
dominant issue differed, the issues pertained to the specific details of an entrepreneurial 
firm’s unique innovation, or an entrepreneurial firm’s general use of machine learning 
technology. Table 12 defines each dominant issue and provides representative data further 





Through my observations, I noticed that across all three customer organizations the 
types of occupational groups involved with each phase of the piloting process varied. I 
confirmed through interviews that representatives from IT departments, data security, 
innovation groups, practicing doctors, nurses, chiefs of medicine, hospital and 
pharmaceutical company executives and head nurses among other group often participated 
in at least one stage of the piloting process. Thus, I coded for who within a customer 
organization voiced an issue and that participant’s occupational group. Through interviews I 
also confirmed if an issue was shared across the customer organization or if just one 
customer participant voiced a concern.  
Since the concerns shared by specific participants might be colored by their general 
views on machine learning and automation, I reviewed my interview transcriptions and field 
notes to code whether customer participants involved in the piloting process were wary of or 
enthusiastic about the use of machine learning to automate medical diagnostic work. I also 
analyzed whether wariness or enthusiasm about the potential for machine learning to 
automate work was a consensus view across customer participants, or if opinions varied. In 
all cases’ enthusiasm or wariness varied within team, thus there was no consensus view on 
machine learning. 
3. Analyzing entrepreneurial firm actions in response to issues. To better understand how 
entrepreneurial firms shaped the implementation of novel innovations, I traced the actions 
entrepreneurial firms enacted across each stage of the piloting process in response to issues 
shared by their dyadic customer counterparts. Two types of actions emerged: entrepreneurs 
made physical changes to their innovations and changed the scope of how their innovations 





firms engaged in: opening; augmenting; and customizing. Opening occurred when 
entrepreneurs made transparent the logic behind the algorithms and machine learning 
programs underpinning their innovations for customer counterparts. For example, when 
INFECTION shared that they provide Red Hospital with the code behind their treatment 
planning functionality, I coded this as opening. Augmenting consisted of altering the data 
used to train a machine learning program. When Blue hospital insisted SKIN incorporate 
more data from minority groups to train their skin cancer detection program as part of their 
pilot, I coded this as augmenting. I defined customizing as making changes to an innovation 
based on a specific customer’s preferences. When INFECTION disabled functionality 
which would automate the process by which doctors develop treatment plans for bacteria 
resistant diseases in order to pilot with Red hospital, I coded this as customizing.  Table 13 
defines these responses and relays representative data.  
Across dyadic pairs, entrepreneurial firms also reframed the functional scope of their 
innovations for customer counterparts. When entrepreneurial firms reframed the functional 
scope of their innovations, they did not make physical changes to their innovation, but 
rather altered the purported way an innovation could be used in practice - by suggesting that 
their innovations could automate routine, or complex work. When entrepreneurial firm 
focused on what my informants called “routine work” they suggested that their innovations 
automated mundane medical diagnostic work, such as triaging patients with easily observed 
skin malignances. A focus on complex work consisted of purporting an innovation could 
identify unknown malignancies or recommend a treatment plan. For example, when 
MAMMO suggested their innovation could identify new potential indicators for breast 





5.  Mapping customers’ organizational response to deployment of innovations. After 
understanding the actions entrepreneurial firms took in response to customer issues, I traced 
how, if at all, customer organizations shifted their work practices during and directly after 
the piloting process. I identified four t shifts in work practices. Three shifts involved ways in 
which a customer’s workflow was altered and included, adding tasks, eliminating tasks or 
changing the sequencing of a customer’s workflow. One shift, shifting roles, involved 
changing which occupational group was responsible for a set of tasks within an organization. 
I then evaluated the relationship between actions entrepreneurial firms took to alter their 
innovations in response to customer issues and the way organizations shifted their work 
practices across the piloting process. From this analysis, I constructed a grounded process 
theory about the relationship between the design of novel innovations and their use.  
 
DIGITAL DIAGNOSIS 
When I first began to observe interactions between the six entrepreneurial firms and 
three customer organizations in my sample, I quickly heard customers voice concerns about 
piloting entrepreneurs’ innovations within their organizations. Issues regarding, “product 
efficacy, efficiency, and compatibility, all came to the fore. However, I was particularly taken 
aback by how enthralled customers were by the topic of machine learning and automation. 
Some customers seemingly desired to talk of little else. For example, after talking about 
machine learning and automation for 23 minutes, I attempted to get, Tom a chief of 
medicine at Red health system to talk about how their pilot with one of the startups was 
progressing. Tom shifted the line of questioning back to automation and quickly replied, 





replace the critical insight people provide about cancer with reports from a machine.”   
Individual customer participants were stridently bifurcated in their views about 
machine learning as some viewed machine learning innovations as true benefits to their 
organizations. Others, like Tom, viewed it as cause for major concern. As put by a 
representative from IT at Blue health system, “Here you either believe machine learning for 
diagnostics is the next coming, a way to make the whole system efficient or well you are 
totally against it. This causes a major problem – how do you get everyone involved on the 
same page?” This created a challenge for entrepreneurs who had to appease both 
enthusiastic and skeptical customer participants, all of who were involved in the process of 
piloting and ultimately the decision to broadly diffuse an innovation across an organization. 
As such, over the course of my study, I paid attention to whether the customer 
participants involved in a pilot generally shared enthusiasm for the potential for machine 
learning to automate work or were wary of this possibility. I traced the relationship between 
sentiment, issues, the way entrepreneurs responded to issues and ultimately how changes 
were made to customer organizations across and directly after the piloting process. In doing 
so, I observed the process of piloting an innovation unfold in two distinct ways. Tables 14a, 
b and c provide representative data of the differences by stage in the piloting process.  
Decisioning stage.  
 During the decision stage of the piloting process, customers determined whether 
they would pilot an entrepreneur’s innovation and the initial scope of a potential pilot. As 
shared by Jenny the CEO of SKIN, scoping involved:  
Figuring out, what aspects of our application would be trialed, for how long, 
which groups would use it and how we would determine a pilot was 





back and forth. For example, you can figure out what aspects of your 
application will be piloted, but once you hone in on a particular group to 
pilot with, you usually have to go back and reassess what it is you are testing. 
 
The winding, non-linear aspect of the decisioning stage evolved differently when the group 
of customer participants involved in the piloting process were enthusiastic compared with 
when they were wary of machine learning. The process varied in the time it took to complete 
this stage of the piloting process, in the issues they shared with entrepreneurs and in the 
ways entrepreneurs responded to those issues. Perhaps surprisingly, when customer 
participant groups were generally enthusiastic about machine learning the decision process 
took much longer, three and a half months on average compared with one month when 
customers were skeptical of machine learning.  Table 14a provides representative data on the 
issues that emerged during the decisioning stage and how entrepreneurial firms responded to 
these issues.  
When customers participants were generally wary of machine learning they shared 
issues with entrepreneurial firms that pertained to their use of machine learning to conduct 
diagnostic work, rather than issues pertaining to an entrepreneurial firm’s discreet 
innovation. As shared by Steve the CIO of INFECTION, “[x hospital] had a million general 
questions about the efficacy of using machine learning, but hardly any questions were about 
how we specifically use it, or really about anything else.” For example, over the course of 
three meetings to decide on a pilot with INFECTION, I observed representatives at Red 
health system bicker back and forth about whether they should be investing time and money 
into machine learning, as most members in the group, did not believe that it was a stand in 
for human decision making. Yet, as the meetings progressed, to appease members of the 





the scope for a potential pilot with INFECTION. As shared by a chief of nursing at Red 
hospital, “We are a consensus-oriented group. We like to find a solution that everyone can 
live by. John [the CIO of Red hospital] really like the INFECTION guys, and so we carved 
out a way. This consensus orientation was not lost on the CEO of INFECTION, “the CIO 
of Red health system was really into machine learning. And everyone else just sort of wanted 
to make sure he walked away with a win too. But it had an impact on what we did with our 
pilot”. 
    INFECTION’s innovation could diagnosis known and unknown abnormalities. It 
also could suggest treatment for bacterial diseases. While the team at Red health system 
agreed to a pilot, INFECTION had to focus the scope of their innovation on automating 
“complex tasks” which in this case comprised only of generating suggestions for treatment. 
As shared by the CEO of INFECTION, “This was the compromise. They agreed on 
treatment, because it was sort of hard to contain. Yea doctors do it, but it is so hard to find 
the right treatment for a resistant strain. They use trial and error today. So, it wasn’t really 
replacing anything they were doing. We pitched it as totally new.” Since no one really owned 
the process of treating “resistant strains” and the organization viewed this both as new and 
value adding, they agreed to a pilot with INFECTION.  
In contrast, when customers were generally enthusiastic about the prospect of 
machine learning technologies, the decisioning phase generally took longer and involved 
entrepreneurs making physically changes to their innovations in preparation for a pilot. For 
example, INFECTION also engaged with Blue health system over the course of my study. 
The team at Blue, were generally excited about the potential for machine learning 





benefits of machine learning with the team. Instead, the customer team focused on the 
capabilities of INFECTION’s discrete innovation. As put by the CIO of Blue health system, 
“We wanted to understand everything. The code, what type of data they were drawing on. 
We wanted to make sure their data sources were robust to diverse populations. We wanted 
to see it all”. In response, during the decisioning phase, INFECTION engaged in opening, 
augmenting and customizing their innovation. Customization was triggered as INFECTION 
went back and forth with the team at Blue to understand how their innovation might be 
deployed and also to fulfill Blue’s requirements of their discrete innovation. As the CEO of 
INFECTION shared, “Our data privacy protocols were just not good enough for them. We 
had to fix them. That took some time, actually over a month.” 
While some members of the team at Blue were less enthusiastic about machine 
learning, they artfully directed their concerns at INFECTION’s innovation, rather than the 
use of machine learning. A chief of medicine explained, “They are all so hyped by machine 
learning. Attacking that is not a winning strategy. Instead, I focus my attention on issues 
with the product and try to narrow the scope of the product down. That way, at least I can 
get some piece of mind and move the thing in a direction that I can live with.” Thus, to gain 
commitment for a pilot, INFECTION also narrowed the potential scope of their 
innovation. In contrast to the scope of their pilot with Red hospital, which was focused on 
advanced work, with Blue hospital, INFECTION’s scope focused on automating routine 
work, or identifying known issues associated with diagnosing bacteria resistance. As the 
customer team debated and reviewed INFECTION’s innovation, they realized the processes 
surrounding the less complex tasks were well known. If they had to narrow the focus of the 





well understood, that INFECTION could easily integrate into. 
Integrating stage.  
 During the integration stage, entrepreneurs tested how their innovations worked 
with the systems and processes used by a customer organization and potentially adjusted 
both innovations and customer work environments in response. As shared by the CEO of 
SKIN, integration involved both entrepreneurs and customers making adaptations:  
You would think everything gets figured when we scope out the pilot. But it 
doesn’t. There is so much you just don’t anticipate. Like, oh, they use this 
program, so we need to have a feed to that. Or oh, they don’t do this other 
thing, so we have to turn this off. Plus, often they have to change a little bit 
too. They did to add a new step, or a step in their process becomes 
redundant. Some of that stuff comes up when you try to get operational.  
 
For entrepreneurial firms engaging with customer teams wary of machine learning, 
integration took on average three- and one-half months as entrepreneurial firms iterated on 
their innovations to comply within customer work environments. In contrast, for firms 
engaging with customer teams enthusiastic about machine learning, integration took about 
one and half months, and entrepreneurial firms made few iterations to their innovations.    
For example, SKIN’s counterparts at Blue health system were generally wary of 
machine learning. Like INFECTION, during the decisioning stage, SKIN had narrowed the 
focus of the innovation, which could detect cancerous skin lesions, down to focus 
identifying malignancies difficult to detect with the human eye, or unknown malignancies. 
They faced a score of challenges during the integration stage of piloting. First, processes 
were not yet in place for what to do when SKIN’s innovation detected a malignancy. As the 
head of Nursing shared, “Should we double check it? How do we double check it? When 





develop some basic protocol for managing the process.  
Further, these questions prompted the customer team to dig more deeply into 
SKIN’s underlying innovation. As the head of Nursing continued, “If it was going to detect 
stuff we couldn’t see, we needed to know how it worked. Like what data does it use? How 
does it actually work.” In response, SKIN engaged in opening and also augmenting to satisfy 
the concerns of the customer team. In fact, they added a new data set to their database, 
based on concerns that their innovation did not represent diverse populations. SKIN also 
engaged in customizing, to ensure that their innovation met the unique security requirements 
of Blue which were difficult to truly identify as they were “charting new territory” as put by 
the head of Nursing. As the CIO of SKIN shared, “Because we were doing something new, 
they had this crazy thing the wanted us to do to, to absolutely ensure data privacy. No one 
else wanted this, but we built it in.”  
 In contrast, when entrepreneurial firms focused the scope of their innovations on 
routine work, the integration phase took less time. Further, entrepreneurs at this stage in the 
pilot process made minimal changes to their innovations (e.g., 1-2 iterations) and customers 
made few changes to their systems or processes. Entrepreneurs and customers alike gave 
two reasons for these differences. First, as explained by SKIN, who also worked with a team 
at Red who were generally enthusiastic about machine learning, “Much of the hard work had 
been done.” During the decisioning stage, SKIN had augmented and customized their 
innovation to appease Red. Thus, most issues were “taken care of already and it felt like our 
product just fit in,” as explained by the CIO of SKIN. Second, because they focused the 
scope of their pilot on routine work, the processes and procedures supporting such work 





handed us their protocol and were like, ok, which steps stay? Which steps change or do we 
need to add steps? We did have to do a little bit of iteration, to ensure our workflow 
matched up, but it was basic.”  
Deploying stage.  
During deployment, entrepreneurial firms implemented their innovations within 
customer work environments and assigned customer teams began to use these innovations 
in practice. When piloting, deployed innovations ran in parallel with traditional diagnostic 
methods. For example, during their pilot with COMMUNITY health system, SENSOR’s 
medical device was trialed by a geriatric health team interested in detecting bone diseases in 
elderly patients. However, doctors and nurses also leveraged traditional methods during the 
trial, as backup. As the pilots unfolded, innovations that were scoped to focus on routine 
work, operated smoothly, meaning entrepreneurs made few adjustments to their innovations 
after deployment, and customer organizations’ processes and procedures changed as 
expected and discussed during the integration phase.  This stood in stark contrast to pilots 
scoped to automate complex work. These pilots were stopped and restarted multiple times 
as entrepreneurs made adjustments to their innovations and customer teams revised their 
operating procedures to accommodate changes to workflow that unexpectedly occurred. On 
the customer side, all of the customer organizations made changes to their work practices 
during piloting of entrepreneurial firm’s innovations. However, customer organizations 
varied in the type of work practices they changed.  
When piloting innovations scoped to automate complex work, organizations 
changed work tasks and shifted roles. For example, in Red health system, SENSOR was 





challenges, based on identifying new indicators. SENSOR and Red hospital created new 
tasks for doctors and nurses to read the reports created by SENSOR, and to proactively 
connect with patients. This was the opposite of how doctors and nurses generally engaged 
with such patients. They typically interacted with patients responsively, when a patient, or a 
patient’s care giver asked for an appointment. Red hospital also shifted who was responsible 
for this type of care. During integration it was suggested that doctors reach out to patients 
diagnosed through SENSOR’s device, with potential mental health challenges, but nurses 
felt this type of “care” fit into their jurisdiction. As a nurse at Red explained to me, “Nurses 
were responsible for triage, and as such, we should contact patients and tell them to come 
in.” This tension came to a head during SENSOR’s pilot with Red hospital.  
In contrast, when pilots were focused around automating routine work, customer 
organizations altered their work tasks but roles did not shift. For example, when SENSOR 
piloted their medical device with Blue, they focused on using their device to monitor patients 
in hospital settings. Blue hospital added steps to their workflow to account for alerts 
triggered by SENSOR’s device. However routine patient monitoring was in the jurisdiction 
of floor nurses (and occasional doctors who could access reports from SENSOR’s device). 
The deployment of SENSOR’s device did not shift the work arrangements of doctors, 
nurses, or other occupational groups within Red hospital.  
VARIATION IN WORK PRACTICE DISPLACEMENT AND PACE OF 
INNOVATION 
Perhaps not surprisingly, entrepreneurial firms that piloted innovations focused on 
automating routine work tasks, were more likely to complete pilots and complete pilots more 





unfold, I thought that customer organizations wary of machine learning, who had focused 
the scope of pilots on complex work would discontinue their pilots. These pilots had 
triggered turmoil and organizational tension between different occupational groups. Yet, 
many pilots, 40%, continued and some even converted in full contracts with entrepreneurial 
firms during my time of study. Some customer teams seemed fairly comfortable working 
through occupational tension and in the words of one doctor, “Just because we fight among 
ourselves and something causes role upheaval does not mean we should not continue to that 
thing. Honestly, we are always sort of fighting among groups here.” Although 
entrepreneurial firms focusing their pilots on complex work tasks, faced more challenges 
when piloting compared with those focused on routine tasks, they were still able, in a limited 
set of cases, to gain traction and advance their innovations. This suggests that 
entrepreneurial firms that reshaped work roles in customer organizations advanced their 
innovations in different ways than those that that only changed work tasks. Focusing on 
routine tasks, simplified the piloting process, but entrepreneurial firms gave up the 
opportunity to compete at the edge of their product or service’s innovative potential. In 
contrast, focusing on complex work tasks, complicated the process of piloting, but for the 
few entrepreneurial firms that maintained their pilots, and converted pilots into full 
contracts, they were able to push their innovations to new problem spaces. 
Across dyads, I also observed entrepreneurs switching how they integrated and 
deployed their innovations based on customer organizations’ concerns about machine 
learning. This suggests that digital innovations are not static, but rather innovators may incur 
few physical costs when shifting the scope of their innovations to appeal to different 





such a strategy may enable growth. In the words of the CEO of INFECTION, “basically we 
can just turn things on and off. It doesn’t cost us anything or require much work to just stop 
offering certain functionality”. The question remains however if and what type of strategic 
costs firms face when they drastically shift the scope of their products or services to appease 
customers over time?   
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Much research shows how early-stage entrepreneurial characteristics, such as 
demographics or experience affect late-stage outcomes (Zott & Huy, 2007; Hallen & 
Eisenhardt, 2012; Delmar & Shane, 2006; Shane & Stuart, 2002). While these two ends of 
the entrepreneurial journey are well researched, little attention has been paid to the middle 
stages of new venture development where entrepreneurs have developed an innovation but 
have not yet gained market traction (e.g., Pontikes and Barnett, 2017). This dissertation 
examines how entrepreneurs engage in this “middle stage” of venture development to 
conduct market search, gain organizational adoption and pilot their innovations with 
customer organizations. In doing so, I not only illuminate how entrepreneurs gain traction 
for their novel innovations but make several contributions to extant theory at the nexus of 
entrepreneurship, strategy and organizational theory.  
Entrepreneurial transitions in growth and scale 
Heeding calls for in-depth field research on entrepreneurial firm lifecycle transitions 
(Aldrich & Reuf, 2006; Fisher et al., 2016), this dissertation examines how, as opposed to 
whether, 54 entrepreneurial firms gained traction for their innovations and grow. In doing so, 





innovations while maintaining flexibility and legitimacy over time.   
To achieve these goals, research suggests firms cease engaging in actions that might 
have fostered early adoption, and instead focus on increasing market share for launched 
innovations, reducing costs associated with selling existing offerings and improving product 
and process replicability, (Chandler, 1990; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2008; Tidhar & Eisenhardt, 
2020; Desantola & Gulati, 2017). Yet, in a departure from extant scholarship, none of the 
firms I studied pursued growth as outlined. Rather than promoting previously launched 
innovations to increase market share, or improving product and process consistency, firms 
invested resources in developing new use cases. New use cases held the potential to expand 
the relevancy of entrepreneurial firms’ innovations with new and existing customers, thereby 
growing a firm’s market scope. Market scope comprises the range of product categories, 
markets, customer segments or service areas in which organizations actively participate 
(Peng, Lee, & Wang, 2005). Thus, when firms at Cure expanded their market scope, they 
increased the product categories, service areas, or customer segments for which their 
innovation was relevant. 
  Yet the pursuit of scope expansion did not prevent firms from scaling. Scholars have 
long established the relationship between scope and scale and postulate that a focus on scale 
creates the efficiencies necessary to later expand market scope (Penrose, 1959; Gross, 2018). 
As Chandler (1990) illustrates, it was only after Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company found 
cheaper ways to produce glass, centralized their administration and concentrated production 
facilities, that they focused on expanding scope. In contrast to extant scholarship, I observed 
the inverse. By expanding their market scope through the development of new use cases, 





entrepreneurs generated new use cases as they reused costly technology investments and 
retooled more fungible aspects of their underlying innovation, such as user interfaces and 
site content. In this way, entrepreneurial firms scaled the use of their innovations by making 
them more relevant for new and existing audiences. One explanation for this reversal in the 
relationship between scope and scale may be attributed to the maturity of the firms I studied. 
Though growing, all firms were still at a nascent point of development, whereas prior 
research has focused on more mature entrepreneurial firms (Chandler, 1990) or incumbent 
organizations (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Penrose, 1959). This focal difference in firm 
maturity highlights an intriguing insight for future research. As entrepreneurial firms grow, 
the relationship between scope and scale may shift. In nascency, growth in market scope 
begets scale but as firms mature, investments in scale expand a firm’s latitude for growth in 
market scope.  
I also observed entrepreneurs at this “middle” stage of venture development conduct 
search in ways that differed dramatically from those prescribed by extant theory.   Extant 
theory suggests that entrepreneurs narrow their search in favor of select strong ties to foster 
translation and collaboration (Carlile, 2004; Obstfeld, 2005; Long-Lingo & O’Mahony, 
2010); positive feedback, (Perry-Smith & Mannucci 2017) and the convergent thinking 
(Fleming, Mingo & Chen, 2007) needed for implementing novel innovations. Contrary to 
this expectation, I found that when entrepreneurial firms engaged in market search, 
narrowing search, truncated entrepreneurs’ ability to learn what customers valued. As the 
first paper in this dissertation shows, transactional search was a false promise of efficiency, 
as selective search limited the feedback entrepreneurial firms could receive about the 





solving with potential customers. This finding runs counter to theories suggesting that 
narrow search is beneficial when implementing innovations (Fleming et al., 2007; Hansen, 
1999). While narrow search might foster implementation of novel innovations in established 
firms, this was not true for entrepreneurial firms in our study. Why? Incumbent firms can 
draw from a host of internal knowledge sources (Katila & Ahuja, 2002) and thus may not 
require broad search (Dahlander et al., 2016). Further, narrow search can help incumbent 
firms foster the implement of innovations embedded within political and hierarchical 
structures (Allen, 1977; Obstfeld, 2005; Perry-smith & Mannucci, 2017). The entrepreneurial 
firms I studied neither benefited from nor were they constrained by these conditions and 
thus broad search still helped them learn how their innovations could meet customer needs.  
Entrepreneurial firms made more progress gaining market traction when they 
engaged in broad search even at a late stage in the innovation process – if they were willing 
to learn from the ambiguity that search produced. Confirmatory searchers triangulated 
feedback from search, acknowledging what they could understand but learned selectively. 
While the literature on the benefits of confirmatory search for entrepreneurial firms is mixed 
(Camuffo, Cordova, Gambardella, Spina, 2020; Shephard et al., 2012), the entrepreneurs I 
studied were limited by this approach. Camuffo and colleagues suggest that asking questions 
such as “does my innovation fit your needs” can evoke confirmation bias from feedback 
providers, limiting what entrepreneurs can learn about their innovations (2020). This may 
have been one reason why entrepreneurs pursuing confirmatory search failed to close 
customer deals during my study. However, I observed an additional mechanism at work. 
Diagnostic searchers prioritized ambiguous feedback to probe how their innovations might 





alternative understandings or interpretations for their innovations. Thus, it is not just the 
type of search questions entrepreneurs ask of external stakeholders, but also a willingness to 
entertain alternative possibilities that propels market traction. While prior literature focuses 
on how entrepreneurs position or frame their innovations to gain access to resources (Zott 
& Huy, 2007; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2008; Gurses and Ozcan, 2015), I find symbolic moves 
were insufficient to explaining gains how fir. I show the tangible costs associated with 
gaining market traction and how only entrepreneurs willing to make substantive changes to 
their innovations, long after initial launch, were able to grow the relevancy of their 
innovations.   
Organizational adoption and strategic pacing 
A core contribution of this dissertation is examination of two divergent ways 
entrepreneurs pursue organizational adoption for their innovations. The processes that 
emerged from my analysis -- one customer centric, the other market centric -- were aligned 
with two contradictory ways extant literature suggests firms pursue the design of novel 
innovations (Slater & Narver, 1998). One stream heralds customers as a critical source of 
innovative inspiration (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992; von Hippel, 1988). The other steam, in 
stark contrast, argues that firms fail to design novel innovations with broad appeal when they 
“listen too carefully to their customers” (Christensen & Bower, 1996:198).  
As these contradictions suggest, scholars have long debated to what degree firms 
should engage with customers as a source of innovative discovery. This study offers a step 
forward in resolving this persistent debate. All of the firms I studied, regardless of the 
process they pursued, developed use cases with power to fulfill both recognized and latent 





& Bower, 1996; Christensen, 1997; Slater & Naver, 1998), I found that customer executives, 
were not myopic, but rather, rich fonts of information regarding the potential for digital 
health innovations, and how to deliver on that potential. Consider the views of Myra, the 
HR executive who advocated for RECOVERY to examine the role algorithms could play in 
expanding the relevance of their innovation. Analysts, middle managers and professionals 
were less progressive in their views, but not for the reason ascribed by the literature. Doctors 
and nurses for example understood the potential for novel innovations to reshape their work 
environments, in perhaps threatening ways, and advocated against adopting these types of 
innovations for those reasons.  
A customer centric process helped firms develop use cases that were more readily 
adopted by users, whereas a market centric process did not. Literature advocating for 
customer-led innovation, would attribute this to a failure in uncovering unmet customer 
needs stemming from an over-reliance on internal firm knowledge (von Hippel, 1988; 
Jeppesen & Fredriksen, 2006; Lifshitz-Assaf, 2018). Firms that used a market centric process 
tempered their engagement with customers and instead relied on existing firm knowledge to 
develop use cases. However, it did not prevent these firms from designing use cases meeting 
the needs of customer organizations. Lack of customer engagement did limit firms using a 
market centric process from uncovering how to strategically pace the introduction of their 
innovations. A customer centric process helped entrepreneurs build deep relationships with 
various influential members of customer organizations spanning levels, professions and 
roles, who shared their apprehensions regarding how an innovation might alter their work 
environments. From these insights, entrepreneurial firms pursuing a customer centric 





controversial features embedded within these use cases.  
Recent work highlights the positive relationship between venture growth and 
entrepreneurial pacing, where entrepreneurs pause their activities to reflect on their prior 
actions and let market uncertainties shakeout (Mcdonald & Eisenhardt, 2019). I build on 
work addressing the role of pacing in entrepreneurial action (Eisenhardt & McDonald, 2019; 
Wood, Bakker & Fisher, 2021) by demonstrating how entrepreneurs actively use pacing to 
pursue growth. In a departure from the literature, I show how firms use pacing strategically, 
not only as an internal device for reflection and passive learning, or to calculate “waiting 
time” (Schoonhoven et al., 1990). Rather, entrepreneurs used pacing strategically as a way to 
influence the actions of external parties, such as customers. Strategic pacing was a powerful 
device that enabled entrepreneurs to deliver use cases that could evolve with customers’ 
tastes and preferences.  
Adopting organizations and organizational adoption 
Scholars often evaluate how novel innovations influence power, role relations and 
work practices after implementation within an adopting organization (Barley, 1984; Bailey & 
Barley, 2008). Too often innovations are studied, “after adoption, thereby divorcing 
implementation and use from preceding decisions and events...The tendency to left censor 
makes it impossible to determine whether patterns of use are shaped in important ways by 
dynamics of power, control, status, and conflict that set the context of use. (Leonardi and 
Barley 2008:38)”. Rather than explain what triggers a firm’s adoption of a novel digital 
innovation (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Greve; 2011), I show not 
just if, but how entrepreneurs influenced the ways organizations adopt new digital 





firms tailored their innovations to automate advanced forms of work, they gained 
organizational adoption, but catalyzed jurisdictional disputes between doctors and nurses. 
When the same entrepreneurial firms focused their innovations on automating routine work, 
they gained adoption without trigger tension among occupations. Rather than suggest that 
internal power relations shape the ways innovations are implemented, I show how 
entrepreneurs, from outside the organization, anticipate organizational concerns about 
power and roles relations and preemptively adjust the functionality of their innovations in 
response. By doing so, I heed Leonardi and Barley’s (2008) call to unite research on design, 
with implementation and use.   
In contrast to the literature, which typically evaluates the relationship between how 
an innovation is framed and if it is adopted and diffused (Kahl & Grodal, 2016; Gurses & 
Ozcan, 2016), I examine the adoption process from discovery through acceptance. As a 
result, I shed light on the important role non-executives and professionals play in designing 
novel innovations and attenuating their disruptive qualities. Ferlie et al. (2005) suggest that 
the boundaries between professional communities can slow the pace at which novel 
innovations diffuse. Building on this work, I found that professionals and other occupational 
groups influenced if and how an innovation was adopted. In contrast, in this study 
professionals and other occupational groups often worked collectively to upend the 
adoption of a potentially threatening innovation. Anteby et al. (2015) suggest, little research 
addresses the conditions under which occupational groups and others collaborate to 
collectively act. This study suggests that adoption decisions, which may threaten to introduce 
technology reshaping organizational work environments may create the occasions for 





interests. For entrepreneurial actors, understanding how to craft products and services that 
accommodate the preferences of diverse decision makers and influencers becomes an 
important component to gaining adoption for novel innovations.  
LIMITATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
I focused on explaining the process of gaining market traction, as I uncovered it, 
rather than identify the antecedents or entrepreneurial traits predicting why entrepreneurial 
firms pursued different processes. Entrepreneurial firms engaging in different markets or 
fields might face different challenges and as a result, pursue different pathways for market 
traction. It is also possible that entrepreneurial firms may transition the way they pursue 
market traction over time. Future research could assess over longer time durations, if and 
why firms shift their strategies. In my research design, firms had access to common 
resources, but I cannot control for ways in which firms may have differed in their pre-
existing resource endowments.  
Moreover, this research does not address the long-term effects of leveraging a give 
pathway for market traction in the field of health or other fields of interest. Future research 
would do well to understanding the degree to which one path or another fosters different 
types of entrepreneurial growth (i.e., funding) in the field of digital health and beyond. This 
study offers one way in which entrepreneurial firms transition from infancy by developing 
new use cases and expanding market scope. Yet, much remains to be uncovered regarding 
how entrepreneurs balancing often divergent needs for scale and flexibility, differentiation 






































COORD Care Management 1 M 5 High high 5 no 
CARE Care Management 1 M 4 High mid 2 no 
DRUGS Care Management 1 M 1 Mid high 2 yes 
NOSHOW Care Management 1 M 4 High high 1 no 
MANAGE Care Management 1 M 3 Mid high 4 no 
CLAIMS Care Management 1 M 3 High low 3 yes 
PHYSICAL Care Management 1 M 1 Low mid 2 no 
CAREAIDS Care Management 1 F 4 High low 1 no 
PRESS Care Management 1 F 1 Low low 4 no 
TINY Care Management 1 F 2 Mid mid 2 no 
DEVICES Care Management 1 F 2 High low 2 no 
EMERGENCY Care Management 1 F 2 Mid high 3 no 
ATTEND Care Management 2 M 4 High mid 3 Yes 
DIRECTIONS Care Management 2 M 5 High low 3 Yes 
SOUND Care Management 2 M 3 High high 4 Yes 
ROBOT Care Management 2 M 3 mid high 3 Yes 
SMARTH Care Management 2 M 6 high high 3 Yes 
GIVERS Care Management 2 M 4 mid mid 2 Yes 
E-RULES Care Management 2 M 3 high high 3 Yes 
SCREENS Care Management 2 M 7 high high 1 Yes 
ELDER Care Management 2 F 2 low low 2 Yes 
MATERNITY Care Management 2 F 2 low mid 2 No 
VITAL Care Management 2 F 1 low low 2 No 
BREATH  Care Management 2 F 4 low mid 3 No 





SENSE Diagnostics 1 M 2 low mid 5 no 
BEEB Diagnostics 1 M 2 low low 2 no 
VIRTUAL Diagnostics 1 M 8 high high 4 yes 
TELA Diagnostics 1 F 2 high mid 4 no 
CANCER Diagnostics 1 F 2 low mid 2 no 
DOSING Diagnostics 2 M 3 low low 2 No 
WHITE Diagnostics 2 M 1 low mid 4 No 
RULES Diagnostics 2 M 5 mid high 3 Yes 
BLOOD  Diagnostics 2 M 5 low low 2 No 
INJECT Diagnostics 2 M 1 low low 1 no 
RARE Diagnostics 2 M 2 high mid 3 Yes 
DIAB Diagnostics 2 M 3 mid mid 4 Yes 
ANALYTICS Diagnostics 2 M 1 low mid 3 No 
RECOVERY Diagnostics 2 M 2 mid mid 2 No 
BACTERIA Diagnostics 2 F 2 low low 3 Yes 
EMERGE Patient Education 1 M 3 high mid 4 yes 
END Patient Education 1 F 2 mid low 1 yes 
FRIENDS Patient Education 1 F 1 mid low 2 no 
GAMES Patient Education 1 F 3 low mid 1 no 
INTERVENE Patient Education 2 M 1 low low 1 No 
AI Patient Education 2 F 1 high high 1 no 
DIRECTORY Patient Education 2 F 2 mid mid 2 No 
CHARGE Treatment 1 F 4 low high 2 yes 
SLEEP Treatment 2 F 4 high high 3 No 
NUTRITION Wellness 1 M 3 mid low 2 no 
COACH Wellness 1 M 3 mid low 4 no 
ECARE Wellness 1 M 2 mid low 3 no 
WELL Wellness 2 M 3 mid high 2 No 
PLATE Wellness 2 M 7 mid high 2 Yes 
Revenue: Low < $1,000 < Mid < $345,000 < High 







Table 2: Overview of types and timing of data collected   
  Q4'16 Q1'17 Q2'17 Q3'17 Q4'17 Q1'18 Q2'18 Q3'18 Q4'18 
Observations  
(1,000+ hours) Onsite and events 
                  
Interviews  
(n = 200) 
Entrepreneurial firms, adopting 
organizations, regulators, Cure 
staff, experts                   
Entrepreneurial Firm 
Data 
Application & evaluations   
                  
Venture revision tracking  
                  
Strategic documents 












Observations – Embedded within Cure, invited to all Cure status, board of  director meetings, events, many post mortems, a few 
late night “cram” sessions around key events, observed and attended entrepreneurial firm internal and external working sessions  
 
Interviews - Occurred before, during and after the accelerator program; included both highly structured and unstructured 
protocol to regulate responses across various stakeholder groups 
 
Entrepreneurial Firm Data – collected throughout the program (e.g., Revenue, funding, founding team characteristics, new use-





Table 3: Cure Cohort 1 Entrepreneurial Firm descriptive data a Cure program entry (Names differ paper to paper to mask firm 



















MALE 4 High High 1 Application to prevent cancelations 
CARING FEMALE 2 High Low 1 Platform to support care at home 
CORDCAR MALE 4 High  Mid 2 Platform to improve in hospital care  
DEVICEPACK FEMALE 2 High  Low 2 
Platform for surgical planning and 
scheduling  
FALL MALE 2 High  Low 3 Platform to improve employee safety  
INSTRUCT MALE 4 Mid  Mid 4 Digital pre-operative instructions  
INTEROP MALE 3 High High 4 
Integrated platform and APIs for health 
data 
MDCOR MALE 5 High High 5 Platform to coordinate complex care cases  
OPSIGNAL FEMALE 2 Mid High 3 
Platform for ambulatory support and data 
exchange 
SIGNAL MALE 2 High Mid 2 Real-time patient data delivery system  
TELEMED FEMALE 5 Low Low 2 Telemedical diagnosis and support service 
PUBLIC  MALE 3 High High 4 Virtual diagnosis and support service 
DIETAP 
Education  
MALE 3 Mid Low 4 
Dieting and nutrition application and 
service 
EASE FEMALE 2 Low Mid 1 
Application which supports end of life 
planning 
FLAG MALE 3 Mid Low 2 Non-verbal therapy and behavioral support 
HEALTHYAP FEMALE 3 Mid High 3 
Dieting and nutrition application and 
service  
NUDGE FEMALE 1 Low Low 2 Behavioral support for addiction recovery 
PLAY FEMALE 3 Low Mid 1 




FEMALE 2 Mid Mid 2 Wearable monitor of vital measurements  





MONITORDEV FEMALE 1 Low Low 4 Wearable blood pressure monitor  
SENSEDEVICE FEMALE 4 Mid High 2 Brain stimulator  
SENSOR MALE 2 Low High 5 Device that measures motion  
TESTDEVICE MALE 2 Low Mid 4 
Device for heart attack prevention and 
diagnosis  
PACK MALE 1 Low Mid 2 
Packages prescriptions for home 
distribution 
CAREVR 
Virtual Reality  
  
MALE 1 Low Mid 2 Virtual reality recovery platform  
CONTENTVR MALE 2 Mid Low 3 Virtual reality experiences for the elderly 
QUICKD MALE 8 High High 4 
































“We use to 
have time to 
talk to 
everyone but 
now the focus 




FALL   
Concrete 
“They were 
super specific in 
what they 
wanted us to do 








dismissing the relevance of 
learning from feedback 
 
“I heard the same 
thing about data 
inconsistencies with 
[customer name] and 
we went ahead 
without it.” FALL  
Deflecting Feedback 
pushing back and arguing 
against the validity of the 
feedback 
 
“I tried to tell [hospital 
customer] that our [issue] 
doesn’t matter, no one cares 
about that in society run by 
small tech firms, but they 




products in response to 
concrete feedback 
 
“In the end, to get 
the deal, we have to 
just built it. It’s a 




















talking to our 
peers to 
understand if 





“We focused on 
their immediate 
clear concerns, 
that way we can 





admitting the validity of 
feedback based on prior 
learning without revising 
their innovation 
 
“We have totally 
heard the concern 
about adherence to 
games, will kids keep 
playing.” PLAY  
Reframing Feedback 
learning about technical 
challenges to their innovation and 
revising their target market 
without making changes to their 
innovation 
 
“Our product is cooked, we 
have done tons of technical 
and usability tests, but our 
assumptions about the 



























talking to us. 
You never 
















feedback into a familiar 
lens 
 
“We are doctors and 
scientists. We get how 
to take vague ideas 
and turn them into 
something actionable. 
We are trained to do 
that.” SIGNAL 
Redirecting Feedback 
Drawing attention away from 
concrete feedback towards 
learning about new sources of 
value 
 
“The direct stuff gets you in 
trouble. Every customer 
wants these mini, but 
annoying custom changes. 
You have to shift them 
away from that, towards 
valuable actions. And well, 
actions that get us a deal vs. 




Learning how to 
repurpose an 
innovation to create 




“They had an idea 
about delivering 
more benefits to 
their employees. 
We didn’t see it at 
first, but we both 
explored it together 








Table 5: Market Traction Progress 









Targeted 1. Vetted Pipeline 
2. Adaptation to Target 
Market 




















IC, H, T, 
MD G, P, O 
Increased access to top 
executives  
 
“We were able to get in 
touch with the person that 
is number four in the 
entire organization.” 
CAREVR 
No adaptation to target 
market 
 
“We are in the global health 
space and I think that is 
where we really have a lot of 
expertise in it, and we do 
not plan on shifting that in 
anyway.” INSPECT  
No new sources 
of revenue 
 
“We made changes 
to our product but 
still didn’t get the 




















 IC, H, T, 
MD G, P, O  
Increased breadth and 
depth of customer 
relationships 
 
“We made progress on our 
goal, which was to unlock 
an organization and get to 
know all the decision 
makers.” DEVICEPACK 
Narrowed target market 
 
“We shifted hard towards 
the clinical trials market, 
which was narrower [than 
the original target market] 
but allowed us to use our 
product as is.” SENSOR 


















IC, H, T, 
MD G, P, O  
Increased breadth and 
depth of customer 
relationships 
 
 “We worked to meet a lot 
of people at [customer]. 
That way we could figure 
out their level of 
engagement.” OPSIGNAL  
Expanded target market 
 
“We identified ways in 
which a [a new type of 
customers] could average 
parts of our offering as a 
customer.” DIETAP  
Grew new sources 
of revenue 
 
“We signed a paid 















Table 6: Search & Learning Practices Enacted by Entrepreneurial Firms in Cure Cohort 1 
 
Type of Market 
Search Firm Pseudonym 
 
  
Minimizing Deflecting Conceding Acknowledging Reframing Translating 
Discovering 
new 
opportunities  Redirecting 
Transactional 
N=9 
ALIGNPLAT X X X       
CORDCAR X X X       
FALL  X X X     
MDCOR X X X      
FLAG X X       
HEALTHYAP X X X  X     
INSPECT  X X      
PACK X X X  X    
CAREVR X  X      
Confirmatory 
N=9 
CARING    X X    
DEVICEPACK  X  X X    
PUBLIC    X X    
NUDGE    X X    
PLAY   X  X X    
HEARTBEAT X    X X  X  
MONITORDEV   X  X     
SENSOR    X X    
CONTENTVR    X X  X  
          






Table 6: Search & Learning Practices Enacted by Entrepreneurial Firms in Cure Cohort 1(continued) 
 
 
Type of Market 
Search Firm Pseudonym         
  
Minimizing Deflecting Conceding Acknowledging Reframing Translating 
Discovering 
new 
opportunities  Redirecting 




INSTRUCT      X X  X  
INTEROP      X  X 
OPSIGNAL      X X  X 
SIGNAL    X  X  X 
TELEMED      X X  X 
DIETAP    X  X X X 
EASE    X  X X X 
SENSEDEVICE      X X X 
TESTDEVICE     X X  X 









Table 7: Entrepreneurial Firm Data for Cohort 1 by Market Search Type at Cure program entry  
 















ALIGNPLAT Care Mgmt MALE 4 High high 1 No No 
CORDCAR Care Mgmt MALE 4 High Mid 2 Yes No 
FALL Care Mgmt MALE 2 High Low 3 No No 
MDCOR Care Mgmt MALE 5 High High 5 Yes Yes 
FLAG Education MALE 3 Mid Low 2 No No 
HEALTHYAP Education FEMALE 3 Mid High 3 Yes Yes 
INSPECT Medical Device FEMALE 1 Low Mid 2 No Yes 
PACK Medical Device MALE 1 Low Mid 2 No Yes 
CAREVR Virtual Reality  MALE 1 Low Mid 2 Yes No 
Confirmatory 
N=9 
CARING Care Mgmt FEMALE 2 High Low 1 Yes No 
DEVICEPACK Care Mgmt FEMALE 2 High Low 2 Yes No 
PUBLIC Care Mgmt MALE 3 High High 4 Yes Yes. 
NUDGE Education FEMALE 1 Low Low 2 No Yes 
PLAY Education FEMALE 3 Low Mid 1 No no 
HEARTBEAT Medical Device FEMALE 2 Mid Mid 2 No no 
MONITORDEV Medical Device FEMALE 1 Low Low 4 No Yes 
SENSOR Medical Device MALE 2 Low High 5 No Yes 
CONTENTVR Virtual Reality  MALE 2 Mid Low 3 No No 
Diagnostic  
N=10 
INSTRUCT Care Mgmt MALE 4 Mid Mid 4 No Yes 
INTEROP Care Mgmt MALE 3 High High 4 Yes No 
OPSIGNAL Care Mgmt FEMALE 2 Mid High 3 Yes Yes 
SIGNAL Care Mgmt MALE 2 High Mid 2 No Yes 
TELEMED Care Mgmt FEMALE 5 Low Low 2 No Yes 
DIETAP Education MALE 3 Mid Low 4 No No 
EASE Education FEMALE 2 Low Mid 1 No No 
SENSEDEVICE Medical Device FEMALE 4 Mid High 2 Yes Yes 
TESTDEVICE Medical Device MALE 2 Low Mid 4 No Yes 









activity Representative data  Frequency  
Discovery 
Identifying new use cases 
Engage collaboratively 
with customers to 
uncover opportunities 
which expand the 
relevancy of an 
innovation  
EMERGENCY: "A new use-case happens when customers key you into a 
way to use your product differently. Sometimes customers interact with our 
product and are like wow we have this other problem. Can you help us tackle 
it?" 
DOSING: "When the customer comes to us with an idea about how our tech 
can solve an issue for them, we get them involved in the process of exploring 




Assessing the reusability 
of an underlying 
innovation for a new use 
case 
Decompose solutions 




BEEB: "We got into the details of our conversation with the chief [of 
medicine] and see if we can make our stuff work for that."  
MANAGE: "This hospital CIO wanted to know if we could make our 
application work for them. We had to go through it, see if we could make it 





entrepreneurial teams to 
support new use case 
development 
Allocate dedicated 
team members to new 
use case development 
efforts 
SLEEP: "The new use case was going to take some effort as we didn't know a 
lot about [the new disease area], so we put someone on it, full time." 
ELDER: "We didn't want to focus on Alzheimer’s because, well we didn't 
know that space. A little bit but not well. But the customer made it enticing. It 
does offer a big opportunity, but [person's name] had to be 100% on it, if we 




Determining how to 
position a use for 
customer audiences and 
the speed at which to 
deploy a use case  
Leverage strategic 
pacing to introduce 
new use cases as 
complements to 
processes and systems 
in place;  withhold 
controversial aspects 
of new use cases  
SOUND: “We really are better than all the big company market alternatives, 
but we would never say that out loud. Instead, we say we work with them.”  
SLEEP: "The nurses hated the use-case, totally got rid of their work. So, we 
gave it to them, as support, to make their job easier. We realized it was the only 






Table 9: Market centric process activities and representative data 
Activities  Application of activity Representative data  Frequency 
Discovery 
Identifying new use cases 
Identify use cases based 
on internal team reviews  
PHYSICAL: "As a matter of course, we are always assessing if our 
technology can be applied to a new problem. If we can't quickly identify 
something, we move on. However, we like to spend a lot of time 
figuring out how our technology can be applied and adapted to that new 
problem."  
 
CLAIMS: "We review our progress ever week. During these meetings 
we assess how we can grow, if we can evolve our product to compete 
more effectively in the market 
87% 
Decomposing solutions  
Assessing the reusability of an 
underlying innovation for a new 
use case 
Decompose solutions 
based on analysis of 
competitors' offerings 
BREATH: "When we are thinking about new use-cases, we spend a lot 
of time thinking about what the competition does and how we can 
differentiate." 
 
CAREAIDS: "Before we develop a new use cases, we try to understand 




teams to support new use case 
development 
Allocate team members 
to work across going 
business concerns and 
use case development 
CAREAIDS: "We think this is a small build, and we will use a lot of 
what we have to do this. So we don't need a dedicated team." 
 
CLAIMS: "Reusing existing technology lets us maintain what we are 
doing and also build new" 
92% 
Introducing new use 
cases 
Determining how to position a 
use for customer audiences and 
the speed at which to deploy a 
use case  
Position a use case as a 
substitute for competitive 
offerings and 
organizational processes  
 
Comprehensively 
introduce all features 
embedded within a use 
case 
NICU: “You strike when the irons hot, and don’t hold anything back. 
We want our use-case to beat out the big competition, so we want the 
customer to know everything we can do.” 
 
COORD: "We now have this very comprehensive platform, which 
integrates 3 new elements of automation. It can basically automate most 










Table 10: Use case adoption rates by process 
 
 Customer centric process Market centric process 
Number of use cases by process 21 37 
Sub-sectors by process  
Care management, 
Diagnostics, Patient 




Education, Treatment & 
Wellness 
Percent of use cases targeted at new customer segments 55% 60% 
Percent of firms with a female CEO 38% 32% 
Percent of CEOs with prior venture experience 38% 35% 










Table 11: Customer & Entrepreneurial Firm Dyads 
 
Customer Entrepreneurial firm Pilot opportunity 
Customer attitude 
towards machine learning 
Blue health 
System 
MAMMO Mammogram scans for known abnormalities Enthusiastic 
SENSOR in hospital patient monitoring Enthusiastic 
INFECTION Diagnosis & treatment of resistant bacteria strains Wary 
SKIN Skin cancer diagnosis  Enthusiastic 
Red Health 
System 
MAMMO Mammogram scans for unknown abnormalities Wary 
SENSOR At home elderly health monitoring Wary 
INFECTION Diagnosis of resistant bacteria strains Enthusiastic 
SKIN Skin cancer diagnosis  Wary 
DIAB Diabetes diagnosis  Enthusiastic 




SENSOR in hospital patient monitoring Enthusiastic 
WHITE new indicators of immune system strength Wary 








Table 12: Types of Customer Issues Encountered by Entrepreneurial firms  
 





Reduce loads Decreases 
patient cases per 
health 
professional 
"It was a pretty clear benefit, it [MAMMO's innovation] could decrease loads 





of patient care 
"If [Skin's innovation] can really see stuff that doctors miss, it will change how 
we take care of patients. It is a cheaper model for health, because we can catch 
things earlier with less labor, and a better model for health because we can 








"Part of the reason we do this, pilot, is to learn about the tech. We can take it 
apart, look at it, implement it. People won't say this, but they want to take it 
apart. If it is the next thing in health, well you want to know about it. You 







capabilities   
"One thing we heard, is that diagnosing is multifactorial, you can't just focus 
on one thing and spit out the answer. So, your head hurts, you have a stomach 
ache, and a bunch of other things. A machine can't possible understand that It 




Ethicality Morality of data 
sharing and data 
availability   
"Oh ya. Someone in every meeting says, but what about ethics. you are 
concerned with the robustness of the data to serve diverse communities, give 






"We were very concerned about what machine learning might do to jobs in 
our health system. Yes it could create efficiencies, but what happens to the 







"Their application was really good. Like super smart. I hadn't seen someone 








Table 12: Types of Customer Issues Encountered by Entrepreneurial firms (continued) 
 
Type of issue Issue  Definitions Representative data  
Benefits of an 
entrepreneurial 
firm's innovation  
Reduce loads Decreases 
patient cases per 
health 
professional 
"I'm always wary of applications that say they reduce workload, but this one, I 






"Last time we did something with an entrepreneur, it did not work out. Their 
stuff is just never far enough along that it can just plug into our systems or 





Efficacy of an 
innovation 
Innovation will 
not work as 
purported  
"I just think they are vaporware at this point. It is not going to work like they 






"If we do this, people in my department will lose their jobs in the long-run" 








Table 13: Type of Changes to Entrepreneurial Firms’ Innovations 
 




Sharing code or the logic behind an 
innovation's algorithm with customers 
"They wanted us to open up everything, or code our 
algorithm. So we did" (MAMMO) 
Augmenting 
Alterative the data used to train a machine 
learning algorithm, or a machine learning 
algorithm draws from to conduct analysis  
"We had to update our training to include a new 
database before we piloted." (INFECTION) 
Customizing 
Changing aspects of an innovation based 
on customers' unique requests 
"No way around it, before we would pilot with 






Well known, documented and consistently 
conducted work tasks  
"They had the process of scans down, literally on 
paper, so we could just plug in." (MAMMO) 
Complex 
work 
Rare work tasks: work tasks that are not 
well documented and conducted in a 
consistent manner; or new work tasks 
"No one had really done this before, so yah, they 
didn't have a process for it. They didn't even know 








Table 14a: Decisioning stage issues and adaptations  
Customer 
Attitude Types of issues 
Physical changes 















"They really wanted us to 
open everything up. They 
had a lot of questions 
about what our 





"We made a much 
of changes before 
we even agreed 
and confirmed a 
pilot" 




"We could have run a 
full pilot on the whole 
scope of our stuff, 
but they wanted to 
focus on work they 
understood, and 












5 3-4 months 
Wary  
Related to machine 
learning 
 
"We wanted to get into 
the weeds of our app, but 
they just wanted to argue 
about machine learning. 
It was frustrating but we 
put on a brave face and 
went with it"  
N/A 
  
Focus on complex 
work tasks 
 
"We wanted to focus 
on new stuff, that way 
it wouldn't really 
effect anyone's day to 
day"  
N/A 
0-1 1 month 









Table 14b: Integrating stage issues and adaptations  
Customer  
Attitude Types of issues 
















"We troubleshooted a 
little bit as we were 
getting things set up 




"We changed a bit, 
like this connection 
needed to change 
but very minor 
stuff." 
n/a N/A 






"So much came up as 
we started to, 
attempted to operate 
with their systems. 
They wanted to know 
everything. Like how 
the code works. So 






"When we tried to 
get stuff working, 
we realized our data 
needed to be 




n/a Changes to 
work tasks 
 
"We asked for 
the protocols 
and they didn’t 
have them. So 
we worked 
with them to 
write new 
protocol and 












Table 14c: Deploying stage issues and adaptations  
 
Customer 

















Related to the 
innovation 
 
"We wanted to 
really see if this 
firm's product 
could deliver, that 
is what we were 
looking for." 
N/A N/A Changes to work 
tasks 
 
"We changed our 
process during the 
pilot. We could stop 
doing a few things, 
and had to add a 
step." 
N/A 3-4 months 30% 
Wary  




"The pilot brought 
up so many things. 
First how did the 
product actually 
do? Second, now 
what? What does 
this mean for our 
position on other 
products that use 
machine learning?  
N/A N/A Changes to work 
tasks and roles  
 
 
"Not only would 
our process need to 
change, but well, 
doctors would need 
to take on a new 
role. They would 
need to do more 
proactive patient 
outreach, which we 
sort of think of as 
generally a task for 
nurses." 
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Market search: how entrepreneurs engage 
with partners, suppliers and customers to learn where 
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Are you a 
decision maker? 













Selective search Learn a customer’s articulated needs 







＋ Cultivate a vetted 
pipeline 
o Expand target 
market 
o Revise innovation 









Learn what an organization values
Discovering new 
opportunities
＋ Cultivate a vetted 
customer pipeline
o Revise innovation 











＋ Cultivate a vetted 
pipeline
o Narrow target market









q Identifying paying 
customer
q Prioritizing market 
requirements 
q Adapt to integration 
requirements 
Firm Objectives
q Obtain opportunities for 
paid pilots








Feedback Type of  Progress











Figure 5: A customer centric process for influencing organizational adoption of new use cases 
 
Restrained application of 
prior knowledge:
View that information gained 
while developing initial 
innovation will not fully 
apply to generating a new use 
case
Dedicated resources:
• Enables vetting of 
executives’ ideas
• Enables deep engagement 
to uncover contextual 
understanding of customer 
work environments
Skepticism of executive’s 
views: 
Interest in engaging with 
diverse members of a 
customer organization to 




withholding aspects of a 
use case that can 
displace work or 
organizational role 
relations
• Positioning a use case, 
in the short-term, as a 
complement to 
processes and systems 
customers have in place 
Decomposing to
executive’s needs:
• Generates a robust set of 
design requirements 
• Supports reuse of 
underlying innovation 
Use case adoption 
Scaled use of underlying 
innovation 
Increase in market scope





• Identifies new 
opportunity to extend an 
existing innovation 
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